# Devolution of health services, fiscal decentralization and antenatal care in the Philippines


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"[T]he existing scholarship on the impact of decentralization on health in the country is characteristically thin and with varying degree of methodological rigor."

Abrigo, et. al. (2017)

## Results Chain




Does decentralization of health services lead to greater access to health care services?

# Does decentralization of health services lead to greater access to health care services?

Does greater local government income in a decentralized setting result in greater access to health care services?


## City ratification as natural experiment




Why antenatal care?

## Trends in Antenatal care

#### Increasing access to skilled antenatal care provider...





Source: NDHS, various years. NSO, PSA, ICF Macro

## Trends in Antenatal care


... at varying levels by wealth, education, residence, and birth order...

| Background<br>Characteristic |      | Doctors |      |      | es, Midv<br>and BHW |      |      | Traditional skilled birth<br>attendant/hilot |      |      | No ANC |      |  |
|------------------------------|------|---------|------|------|---------------------|------|------|--|------|------|--------|------|--|
| Characteristic               | 1993 | 2003    | 2017 | 1993 | 2003                | 2017 | 1993 | 2003   | 2017 | 1993 | 2003   | 2017 |  |
| Wealth Quintile              |      |         |      |      |                     |      |      |  |      |      |        |      |  |
| Lowest                       | -    | 8.6     | 9.6  | -    | 63.8                | 81.7 | -    | 16.2   | 0.7  | -    | 11.2   | 7.9  |  |
| Second                       | -    | 22.8    | 23.9 | -    | 65.3                | 73.8 | -    | 6.0  | 0.1  | -    | 5.4    | 2.2  |  |
| Middle                       | -    | 38.9    | 39.6 | -    | 51.8                | 58.9 | -    | 4.2  | 0.3  | -    | 4.7    | 1.3  |  |
| Fourth                       | -    | 58.5    | 61.1 | -    | 37.7                | 38.5 | -    | 1.5  | -    | -    | 2.1    | 0.3  |  |
| Highest                      | -    | 79.9    | 84.5 | -    | 16.7                | 13.9 | -    | 1.0  | -    | -    | 2.1    | 0.9  |  |
| Education                    |      |         |      |      |                     | -    |      |  |      |      |        |      |  |
| No education                 | 10.7 | 6.7     | 8.3  | 22.8 | 26.5                | 65.0 | 41.3 | 38.6   | 2.4  | 25.1 | 27.5   | 24.3 |  |
| Grades 1-6                   | 19.5 | 13.0    | 12.3 | 54.6 | 62.6                | 77.8 | 14.5 | 12.9   | 0.8  | 11.4 | 11.3   | 9.2  |  |
| Secondary                    | 42.7 | 34.2    | 32.1 | 46.5 | 58.0                | 65.9 | 5.1  | 4.1  | 0.1  | 5.7  | 3.4    | 1.8  |  |
| College                      | 72.0 | 71.1    | 68.0 | 25.4 | 25.0                | 31.2 | 1.8  | 1.9  | 0.1  | 1.8  | 1.8    | 0.7  |  |
| Residence                    |      |         |      |      |                     | -    |      |  |      |      |        |      |  |
| Urban                        | 53.9 | 53.0    | 48.1 | 34.4 | 38.2                | 49.1 | 5.7  | 3.7  | 0.2  | 6.1  | 4.7    | 2.5  |  |
| Rural                        | 23.5 | 22.5    | 31.8 | 54.7 | 61.3                | 64.6 | 12.4 | 9.4  | 0.3  | 9.5  | 6.5    | 3.2  |  |
| Birth Order                  |      |         |      |      |                     | -    |      |  |      |      |        |      |  |
| 1                            | 53.4 | 52.0    | 48.5 | 35.7 | 40.9                | 49.9 | 5.8  | 4.0  | 0.2  | 5.1  | 2.9    | 1.3  |  |
| 2-3                          | 42.0 | 42.8    | 41.4 | 44.2 | 48.6                | 55.8 | 7.9  | 4.3  | 0.3  | 6.0  | 4.2    | 2.5  |  |
| 4-5                          | 31.7 | 27.9    | 28.8 | 50.1 | 57.8                | 66.8 | 9.9  | 7.6  | 0.2  | 8.3  | 6.3    | 4.1  |  |
| 6+                           | 21.2 | 17.3    | 14.7 | 50.8 | 55.3                | 66.8 | 14.3 | 14.4   | 0.4  | 13.7 | 12.3   | 8.0  |  |

Source: NDHS, various years. NSO, PSA, ICF Macro

### Trends in Antenatal Care

#### ... and at varying service quality




Source: NDHS, various years. NSO, PSA, ICF Macro

Does city ratification lead to greater local government incomes and expenditures?

## Catch-up to older cities

#### Per capita income from *local* sources

#### Per capita expenditure



Authors' calculations based on BLGF and PSA data.

Does greater local government income translate to greater access to antenatal care services?

| Antenatal care visit by  |
|--------------------------|
| skilled professional and |
| local government         |
| income by source         |

- (/) National Transfers
- (+) Locally sourced
- (\*) Inter-local spillovers

|                                  |                | Correction for | Correction for      |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------|
|                                  | Base model     | endogeneity    | spatial interaction |
|                                  | (OLS)          | (IV-2SLS)      | (SDM IV-2SLS)       |
| A. Had antenatal care by skilled | d professional |                |                     |
| Own-LGU                          |                |                |                     |
| National transfers, In           | -0.011         | -0.030 ***     | -0.008              |
|                                  | (0.011)        | (0.008)        | (0.010)             |
| Local Income (t-1), In           | 0.051 ***      | 0.053 ***      | 0.033 ***           |
|                                  | (0.005)        | (0.004)        | (0.004)             |
| Population (t-1), In             | -0.071 ***     | -0.056 ***     | -0.045 ***          |
|                                  | (0.014)        | (0.008)        | (0.009)             |
| Neighbor-LGU average             |                |                |                     |
| National transfers, In           |                |                | -0.097 ***          |
|                                  |                |                | (0.022)             |
| Local Income (t-1), In           |                |                | 0.067 ***           |
|                                  |                |                | (0.006)             |
| Population (t-1), In             |                |                | -0.047 ***          |
|                                  |                |                | (0.016)             |
|                                  |                |                |                     |
| Observations                     | 13,598         | 13,598         | 13,341              |
| Weak identification F            |                | 10,392         | 1,412               |
| Underidentification F            |                | 3,011          | 2,095               |
| Adjusted R-sq.                   | 0.166          | 0.163          | 0.172               |

| Antenatal care visit in   |
|---------------------------|
| first trimester and local |
| government income by      |
| source                    |

- (/) National Transfers
- (+) Locally sourced
- (\*) Inter-local spillovers

|  |                       | Correction for | Correction for  |
|--|-----------------------|----------------|---|
|  | Base model            | endogeneity    | spatial interaction   |
|  | (OLS)                 | (IV-2SLS)      | (SDM IV-2SLS)   |
| B. Had antenatal visit in first ti   | rimester of pregnancy |                |   |
| Own-LGU  |                       |                |   |
| National transfers, In   | -0.011                | -0.053 ***     | -0.022  |
|  | (0.012)               | (0.015)        | (0.018)   |
| Local Income (t-1), In   | 0.034 ***             | 0.037 ***      | 0.023 ***   |
|  | (0.005)               | (0.005)        | (0.006)   |
| Population (t-1), In   | -0.029 **             | 0.003          | -0.014  |
|  | (0.013)               | (0.014)        | (0.017)   |
| Neighbor-LGU average   |                       |                |   |
| National transfers, In   |                       |                | -0.096 **   |
|  |                       |                | (0.043)   |
| Local Income (t-1), In   |                       |                | 0.038 ***   |
|  |                       |                | (0.009)   |
| Population (t-1), In   |                       |                | 0.032   |
|  |                       |                | (0.032)   |
|  |                       |                | , ,   |
| Observations   | 12,959                | 12,959         | 12,713  |
| Weak identification F  |                       | 9,904          | 1,315   |
| Underidentification F  |                       | 2,882          | 1,974   |
| Adjusted R-sq.   | 0.100                 | 0.096          | 0.096   |
| Local Income (t-1), In  Population (t-1), In  Observations  Weak identification F  Underidentification F |                       | 9,904<br>2,882 | (0.043)<br>0.038<br>(0.009)<br>0.032<br>(0.032)<br>12,713<br>1,315<br>1,974 |

| Antenatal care visit   |
|------------------------|
| frequency and local    |
| government income by   |
| source                 |
| (/) National Transfers |
| (+) Locally sourced    |

(\*) Inter-local spillovers

|                  | Correction for  | Correction for   |
|------------------|---|--|
| Base model       | endogeneity   | spatial interaction  |
| (OLS)            | (IV-2SLS)   | (SDM IV-2SLS)  |
| atal care visits |   |  |
|                  |   |  |
| -0.042 ***       | -0.041 ***  | -0.023   |
| (0.012)          | (0.014)   | (0.016)  |
| 0.024 ***        | 0.024 ***   | 0.010 **   |
| (0.004)          | (0.004)   | (0.004)  |
| 0.022 **         | 0.021 *   | 0.012  |
| (0.010)          | (0.013)   | (0.015)  |
|                  |   |  |
|                  |   | -0.013   |
|                  |   | (0.040)  |
|                  |   | 0.025 ***  |
|                  |   | (0.007)  |
|                  |   | 0.004  |
|                  |   | (0.029)  |
|                  |   |  |
| 13,564           | 13,564  | 13,312   |
|                  | 10,362  | 1,408  |
|                  | 3,004   | 2,094  |
| 0.149            | 0.145   | 0.15   |
|                  | (OLS) atal care visits  -0.042 *** (0.012) 0.024 *** (0.004) 0.022 ** (0.010) | Base model (OLS) (IV-2SLS)  atal care visits  -0.042 *** -0.041 *** (0.012) (0.014) 0.024 *** 0.024 *** (0.004) (0.004) 0.022 ** 0.021 * (0.010) (0.013)  13,564 13,564 10,362 3,004 |

| Delivery by skilled birth |
|---------------------------|
| attendant and local       |
| government income by      |
| source                    |

- (/) National Transfers
- (+) Locally sourced
- (\*) Inter-local spillovers

|                                       | Correction for                                      | Correction for                     |
|---------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Rase model                            |   | spatial interaction                |
|                                       |   | (SDM IV-2SLS)                      |
| · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | (17-2313)   | (3010110-2313)                     |
| naant                                 |   |                                    |
|                                       |   |                                    |
| -0.064 ***                            | -0.032 ***  | -0.007                             |
| (0.016)                               | (0.011)   | (0.012)                            |
| 0.06 ***                              | 0.058 ***   | 0.037 ***                          |
| (0.006)                               | (0.003)   | (0.004)                            |
| -0.012                                | -0.037 ***  | -0.038 ***                         |
| (0.018)                               | (0.010)   | (0.012)                            |
|                                       |   |                                    |
|                                       |   | -0.044                             |
|                                       |   | (0.028)                            |
|                                       |   | 0.052 ***                          |
|                                       |   | (0.006)                            |
|                                       |   | -0.032                             |
|                                       |   | (0.021)                            |
|                                       |   | ` ,                                |
| 19,233                                | 19,233  | 18,867                             |
|                                       | 14,465  | 1,942                              |
|                                       | 4,271   | 2,976                              |
| 0.312                                 | 0.309   | 0.316                              |
|                                       | (0.016)<br>0.06 ***<br>(0.006)<br>-0.012<br>(0.018) | (OLS) (IV-2SLS)  ndant  -0.064 *** |

What does the average local government do with windfall transfers from national government post-city ratification?

## Follow the money...

#### Mainly to general public services, education, and economic services

|                        | Per Capita<br>Income |                        |                               | Per Capita Expenditure by Type |  |                         |                             |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
|                        |                      | Per Capita Expenditure | General<br>Public<br>Services | Education                      | Health,<br>Nutrition and<br>Population | Labor and<br>Employment | Social Services and Welfare | Economic<br>Services |
| City (= 1)             | 0.407 ***            | 0.369 **               | 0.346 ***                     | 0.265 *                        | 0.085                                  | 0.074                   | 0.146                       | 0.406 ***            |
|                        | (0.119)              | (0.146)                | (0.095)                       | (0.134)                        | (0.158)                                | (0.187)                 | (0.344)                     | (0.150)              |
| Local Income (t-1), In | -0.003               | 0.027 ***              | -0.001                        | 0.087 ***                      | 0.005                                  | -0.002                  | 0.02                        | 0.015                |
|                        | (0.008)              | (0.010)                | (0.006)                       | (0.032)                        | (0.022)                                | (0.011)                 | (0.049)                     | (0.020)              |
| Population (t-1), In   | -1.099 ***           | -1.148 ***             | -1.182 ***                    | -0.660 *                       | -1.034 **                              | -0.036                  | -1.419 **                   | -1.041 **            |
|                        | (0.269)              | (0.259)                | (0.217)                       | (0.354)                        | (0.439)                                | (0.135)                 | (0.610)                     | (0.437)              |
| Observations           | 11,124               | 11,124                 | 11,124                        | 11,123                         | 11,124                                 | 11,125                  | 11,124                      | 11,124               |
| Adjusted R-sq.         | 0.215                | 0.114                  | 0.074                         | 0.016                          | 0.025                                  | 0.019                   | 0.071                       | 0.019                |

## Beggar thy neighbor?

City ratification of neighboring municipalities may negatively affect local own-income, and, thereby, own-expenditure

Why?

|                        | Per capita income | Per capita expenditure |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Own-LGU                |                   |                        |
| City (= 1)             | 0.611 ***         | 0.555 ***              |
|                        | (0.046)           | (0.046)                |
| Local Income (t-1), In | 0.068 ***         | 0.072 ***              |
|                        | (0.009)           | (0.010)                |
| Population (t-1), In   | -0.713 ***        | -0.749 ***             |
|                        | (0.079)           | (0.073)                |
| Neighbor-LGU average   |                   |                        |
| City (= 1)             | -0.449 ***        | -0.511 ***             |
|                        | (0.092)           | (0.109)                |
| Local Income (t-1), In | -0.009            | -0.007                 |
|                        | (0.016)           | (0.018)                |
| Population (t-1), In   | 0.054             | 0.048                  |
|                        | (0.048)           | (0.047)                |
| Observations           | 22 270            | 22 270                 |
|                        | 32,370            | 32,370                 |
| Adjusted R-sq.         | 0.667             | 0.567                  |

## Bottom-line

City ratification may have limited impact on own-supply of health facilities and manpower, but may be detrimental to neighboring government units

|                        | Share of barangays with BHS |           |         | thousand<br>ation, log | Night    | lights Poverty i |          | incidence (%) |  |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|---------|------------------------|----------|------------------|----------|---------------|--|
|                        | (1)                         | (2)       | (3)     | (4)                    | (5)      | (6)              | (7)      | (8)           |  |
| Own-LGU                |                             |           |         |                        |          |                  |          |               |  |
| City (= 1)             | -0.005                      | 0.000     | 0.016   | 0.006                  | 0.003    | -0.018           | 1.717    | 1.630         |  |
|                        | (0.026)                     | (0.025)   | (0.043) | (0.043)                | (0.027)  | (0.022)          | (1.091)  | (1.097)       |  |
| Local Income (t-1), In |                             | -0.005    |         | 0.015                  |          | 0.018 ***        |          | 0.037         |  |
|                        |                             | (0.008)   |         | (0.043)                |          | (0.005)          |          | (0.308)       |  |
| Population (t-1), In   |                             | -0.043    |         | 0.172                  |          | -0.03            |          | 2.765         |  |
|                        |                             | (0.055)   |         | (0.193)                |          | (0.043)          |          | (3.019)       |  |
| Neighbor-LGU average   |                             |           |         |                        |          |                  |          |               |  |
| City (= 1)             | -0.292 **                   | -0.303 ** | 0.322   | 0.379                  | -0.254 * | -0.235           | -11.804  | -12.820       |  |
|                        | (0.129)                     | (0.130)   | (0.364) | (0.345)                | (0.148)  | (0.147)          | (13.971) | (14.088)      |  |
| Local Income (t-1), In |                             | 0.090 *** |         | -0.144                 |          | 0.017            |          | 1.600         |  |
|                        |                             | (0.030)   |         | (0.104)                |          | (0.023)          |          | (2.293)       |  |
| Population (t-1), In   |                             | -0.101    |         | 0.044                  |          | -0.215 **        |          | 1.072         |  |
|                        |                             | (0.080)   |         | (0.274)                |          | (0.105)          |          | (8.478)       |  |
| Observations           | 3,120                       | 3,096     | 3,121   | 3,097                  | 34,561   | 28,946           | 7,907    | 7,760         |  |
| Adjusted R-sq.         | 0.100                       | 0.110     | 0.035   | 0.037                  | 0.28     | 0.184            | 0.384    | 0.395         |  |

## Key take-aways

- ❖ Women from more vibrant local economies i.e., with greater government income from local sources have greater access to antenatal care services
  - Robust estimate even after factoring in household characteristics
  - Positive spillovers among neighboring local government units
- Greater national-to-local transfers (in response to city ratification) does not necessarily translate to better health outcomes
  - No statistically discernable impact on access to antenatal care services
  - Windfall transfers do not go to health spending on average not necessarily bad
  - \*"Beggar-thy-neighbor" effect important and needs further analyses
- Has decentralization (of health services) failed?

## Moving forward

- Local development is the way to go
- Strengthen inter-local partnerships
  - To "internalize" spatial spillovers
  - May be easier said than done: inter-local health zones, etc.
- What is it for UHC/Federalism?
  - Need to recognize incentives: Why do past efforts fail not sustained?
  - Need to consolidate efforts: Decentralized at what level?

## References

Abrigo, M.R.M., and D.A.P. Ortiz (2018). Devolution of health services, fiscal decentralization, and antenatal care in the Philippines. <u>PIDS Discussion Paper 2018-42</u>.

Abrigo, M.R.M., Z.C. Tam, and D.A.P. Ortiz (2017). Decentralization and health in the Philippines: A systematic review of empirical evidences. <u>PIDS Discussion Paper 2017-58</u>.



# Service through policy research

## Thank you







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