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Participatory Governance in the Public Provision of Housing: The Case of Local Housing Boards in the Philippines

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Participatory Governance in the Public Provision of Housing:
The Case of Local Housing Boards (LHB) in the Philippines

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Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of the Local Housing Board (LHB) as a platform for participatory governance in the delivery of public housing in an urban setting. It looks into the conduct and outcomes of participation in the LHB using the case study approach. The results show that participatory governance through the Local Housing Board is still evolving. Many cities that institutionalized their LHBs, have used the Board as a legal tool to carry out eviction and demolition. However, in cases when citizens' participation is effectively implemented as the case of the Quezon City Housing Board, the solutions can lead to more acceptable socialized housing arrangements for the community. It could be a slow process but violent confrontations can be avoided and the outcomes can be sustainable in the long run when communities claim ownership of their housing. While participatory governance may not apply in all cases, community driven solutions should still be given optimum emphasis. For the LHB to enable the process, the decision-making process within the Board has to be strengthened with greater representation of Peoples organization; community participation in the selection of their representatives to the Board; and transparency in discussion of issues and decisions of the Board. The LHB should be given funding and made the sole mechanism for consultation and public deliberation concerning public housing services. Its role can also be expanded to include that of a mobilizer for Peoples Plan enabling the implementation of community driven housing projects.

Keywords: governance theory, participatory governance, peoples' participation, local housing board, housing

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List of Acronyms

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
BPOC	Barangay Peace and Order Committee
BUB	Bottom-Up Budgeting
CHR	Commission on Human Rights
CPH	Census of Population and Housing
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CoC	Certificate of Compliance
DDB	Dangerous Drugs Board
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DND	Department of National Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FIES	Family Income and Expenditure Survey
GAA	General Appropriations Act
HCDRD	Housing Community Development and Resettlement Department
HUC	Highly Urbanized Cities
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council
IRA	Internal Revenue Allotment
ISFs	Informal Settler Families
KALAHÍ-CIDDS	Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
LCE	Local Chief Executive
LDC	Local Development Council
LGC	Local Government Code
LGU	Local Government Unit
LHB	Local Housing Boards
LIAC	Local Interagency Action Committee
LPOC	Local Peace and Order Council
LPRAP	Local Poverty Reduction Action Plan
LPRAT	Local Poverty Reduction Action Team

LSB	Local School Board
LSP	Local Shelter Plan
MBCRPP	Manila Bay Clean-Up, Rehabilitation, and Preservation Program
MMRB	Micro-Medium Rise Buildings
NCR	National Capital Region
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHA	National Housing Authority
NSC	National Security Council
PBAC	Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee
PCUP	Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor
PHRU	Pasig Housing Regulatory Unit
PO	People's Organization
QCHB	Quezon City Housing Board
RPRAT	Regional Poverty Reduction Action Team
RRAP	Relocation & Resettlement Action Plan
SDS	Schools Division Superintendent
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SEF	Special Education Fund
SIP	School Improvement Programs
TMO	Tubbataha Management Office
TPAMB	Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board
TRNMP	Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park
UDHA	Urban Development and Housing Act
UPAO	Urban Poor Affairs Office
USO	Urban Settlements Office

Participatory governance in the public provision of housing: The case of local housing boards in the Philippines

Marife M. Ballesteros and Jenica A. Ancheta¹

1. Introduction

Participatory governance is considered a variant of governance theory whereby citizens are directly engaged or involved in the management of resources for economic and social development. The concept was initially developed in the late 1970s and since then has been applied to a wide range of socioeconomic settings as well as influenced the development agenda in many countries.

The increasing interest in participatory governance can be linked to its potential to build capacities for action in the provision and management of public services. Fischer (2018) argued that participatory governance is beyond democratic participation for voting or for transparency. Its practice results in direct purposive engagement of the citizens on pressing issues in the community or society. A typical application of participatory governance is in the delivery of public goods and services. Education, health care, infrastructure, environmental protection, etc. are generally produced by government agency (or civil servants) but citizens can play an active role in the programs, projects or activities that are of consequence to them.

Studies in both developed and developing countries, showed that participatory governance has improved the design of solutions to programs and projects; it has led to quicker responses to emerging issues in the community and has led to higher levels of commitment and motivation in programs and projects (Fischer 2018; Ostrom, E. 1996; Silvestre, H. et al 2016). Moreover, the approach is found relevant in countries where service delivery by the public sector is often constrained by scarce manpower and budget, bureaucratic inertia, and partisan politics (Ostrom, E. 1996; Silvestre, et al 2016).

However, studies also mentioned that participatory approach does not always lead to success. Papadopoulos and Warin 2007 noted that the expected benefits may not be realized in an environment where social and political inequities are high. Also, there are difficulties in measuring impacts of participation due to the absence of reliable information about the distribution of benefits and costs to households (Osmani 2007).

In the Philippines, the legal foundations for the development of participatory governance structures started around 1987 with the change of the political system in the country. The 1987 constitution outlined the need for the reforms to be conducted in cooperation with the private sector.² This was further strengthened with the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992. The LGC has devolved a lot of functions to the Local Government Units (LGUs) including the responsibility to ensure access to basic services and facilities to the marginalized sectors and the

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² The private sector includes not only the business sector but also representatives of civil society and urban poor groups including NGOs, People's Organisations and community-based organisations

establishment of institutional structures, which would facilitate the provision of public goods and services. Similarly, UDHA devolved to LGUs the specific tasks of defining local development priorities and the creation of plans and programs for shelter.

With devolution, LGUs have created structures for peoples' partnerships for delivery of public services in major sectors. One such structure is the Local Housing Boards (LHB) that was organized due to the pressing issues of informal settlements especially in cities. The LHBs was mainly conceived to manage the relocation and resettlement of informal settler families but some LGUs adopted this structure to include local shelter planning. The expanded role of LHB is also the subject of an existing bill in the Philippine Congress that aims to strengthen the LHB as the main governance strategy for local housing and urban development (HB 1722 by Rep Rufino Biazon).

This study examines the effectiveness of the LHBs as a platform for participatory approach in the delivery of public housing in an urban setting. It looks at the conduct and outcomes of participation in the LHB using the case study approach.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a literature review of the theory and evaluation of participatory governance. Section III presents participatory governance in the Philippines; the legal basis and some applications at the national and local levels. Sections IV discusses the institutionalization of Local Housing Board and its adoption by local government units specifically in highly urbanized cities. In Section V, we further examine the LHB in terms of its organization, access and openness, quality of deliberation and results of participation using case studies of three LGUs in Metro Manila. The last section presents the conclusions and policy recommendations.

2. Overview of participatory governance: theory and evaluation

The concept of participatory governance arose from political and social science disciplines that is grounded on the theory of democratic engagement broadly viewed as citizen's engagement through "deliberative" processes (Delli Capini, Lomax Cook, Jacobs 2004 p.315). It is important to note that these processes encompass practices beyond the democratic rights to vote or rights to transparency (Fischer 2018). It includes practices in both "public deliberation" and "co-production".

"Public deliberation" is commonly understood as "a debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants" (Chambers 2003 p. 309). The primary objective is not consensus ("as participants are expected to pursue their interests"), but that public deliberation provides "justification to all affected or the legitimacy of outcomes" (Chambers 2003 p 309). There can be several ways or levels of public deliberation. The public may participate in governing bodies, through public opinion, as arbitrators, as representatives of advisory committees (Rowe and Frewer 2017, Silvestre et al 2016). Public deliberation especially broad based participation is perceived to enable social capital to grow, which can combat conflicts in material interests and moral values and social exclusion in the community and at the same time promote good governance (Osmani 2007). However, the theoretical underpinnings that relates public deliberation with empowerment and expansion of social capital remain undeveloped.

On the other hand, in “co-production”, citizens play a role in the production of public welfare. The concept, which has been recognized in the late 1970s, connotes engagement of citizens and a transformation of the role of the state in the delivery of public services (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007 p. 448). In the 1990s, economists developed a theory of co-production that relates public participation to a production function whereby the “inputs used to produce goods or services are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organization” (Ostrom, E. 1996 p1073). Based on this concept, Ostrom (1996) showed that, in general, the production of goods and services can best be organized either entirely in the public domain or in the private domain. However, in the case of public goods and services, there is no single producer responsible for its production. It is a private-public industry rather than the single bureaucratic apparatus of government. In most countries especially developing economies, civil servants are often not motivated to work up to their capacity. Often, there is also bureaucratic inertia. On the other hand, many citizens or communities have underutilized knowledge, skills, time, etc. The possibilities for co-production under this situation presents the need for complementary inputs from the government and from the citizens.

The practice of participatory governance has indeed grown over the years. The body of literature on the subject has dealt substantially on ways that participatory governance has facilitated governance or improved the traditional models of public administration. One of the interesting findings is on how electoral participation in national governance led to the adoption of pro-poor policies and that variations in electoral participation can affect the welfare of citizens (Osmani 2007). Several studies also reported that community participation especially in decentralized regimes has resulted in efficient outcomes. Some examples are the improved efficiency of irrigation systems that made use of local knowledge on soil conditions, water velocity and shifting water courses (e.g., Chambers 1988; Ostrom, Lam and Lee 1994). The World Development Report 1994 reported about the better design and maintenance of rural water supply projects with high degree of local participation than those with more centralized decision-making (World Bank, 1994). Ostrom (1996) cited how parent and community participation in the delivery of primary education in Nigeria has resulted in better school environment (e.g. better maintained buildings and sanitation) and better education outcomes of students than schools that depend mainly on public funds. Participatory governance has also been valuable in the management of common property resources by users themselves (Ostrom (1990) and in public services provision such as administrative arbitration in Portugal (Silvestre et al 2016). While there are several examples globally that support the hypothesis that participatory approaches improved efficiency, studies also found some failures of participatory governance. Participatory governance may worsen project outcomes in cases requiring technical decisions (Khwjalla 2004). There could also be cases when a strong authority works better than cooperation in management as in the case of the management of water tanks in India (Mosse 1997). Participation may also fail when community representatives have interests that do not reflect the true preferences of the majority (Platteau and Abraham 2002).

The evaluation of participatory governance can indeed be a challenge. Rowe and Frewer 2004 noted that this is attributed to the complex nature of public participation with its many different schemes, levels and scope of citizen’s participation. Participation outcomes are also affected by “initial levels of empowerment and social capital” whereby groups with lower levels of social capital are expected to achieve less (Osmani 2007 p.7). The nature of political regime (i.e. democracy vs autocracy) has also a causal influence on outcomes. However, there are common characteristics or features that distinguish the successful cases from those that failed.

Based on the extensive review of Rowe 2007 p 517; Papadoupoulous and Warin 2007; Osmani 2007, effective participatory governance is characterized by the following:

- Representativeness and access;
- Openness and transparency;
- Speed at which a group comes to its solution;
- Quality of discussions;
- Extent to which the final solutions represented group consensus;
- Capacity and skills of the community/group to work in a team;
- Incentives defined as a situation where the potential benefits from participation outweigh the cost (i.e. there is a specific, tangible concern);
- Absence of a dominant group especially in societies that are highly unequal or with culture of political dominance.

Note that these features are not objective measures but are simply indicators of democratic and effective deliberation. For instance, speed may not appreciate the complexity of the problem and may result in below ideal solutions. Quality can also involve value judgements. It is important to assess these criteria to the objectives of the participatory mechanism and the specific aims and outputs for which participation is being sought.

3. Application of participatory governance in the Philippines

The legal foundations for the development of participatory governance in the country have been embedded in 1987 with the change of the political system in the country. The 1987 constitution outlined the need for reforms to be conducted in a democratic process with greater participation of the private sector.³ The enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) of the Philippines 1991 (Republic Act 7160), which provided for a decentralized system of local governance, further pushed the agenda for participatory governance in the country. One of the operative principles of decentralization is the “participation of the private sector and communities in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic services as an alternative strategy for sustainable development” (LGC Sec 3 (I)).

These laws enabled the creation of new avenues for greater citizen participation at the national and local levels. It also provided the basis for transforming public institutions into agencies that work in solidarity with society and communities. A major program of the national government is the Grassroots Participatory Budgeting (formerly Bottom Up Budgeting) (BUB).⁴ BUB was introduced in 2012 to enable local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and grassroots communities to be involved in the national budget process through the LGUs. It is intended to make the national government budgeting process more responsive to the local needs. As discussed in Box 1 the community participates as voting members of the Committee that identifies priority poverty reduction projects to be funded by the national government. The cities and municipalities convene Local Poverty Reduction Action Teams (LPRATs) with the local chief executive as the head and members composed of CSOs and government

³ Includes representatives of civil society, urban poor groups including NGOs, People’s Organizations and community-based organizations

⁴ The BUB similar to the Porto Alegre Program of Brazil that involved participation of the community in the budget process (World Bank 1994).

representatives. The LPRAT is tasked to formulate a Local Poverty Reduction Action Plan that contains programs and projects that will directly address the needs of the poor and marginalized sectors. This strategy, when effectively implemented, results in projects that improved the lives of the people in the community including the poor (Manasan 2017). Moreover, the implementation of a Bottom Up Budgeting has increased social capital (defined as level of trust) among the members of the community and increased social capital between communities and local officials (Manasan 2017).

At the sub national level, LGUs have to organize local special bodies to promote civil society participation in local governance. In particular, the LGC identified local special bodies for the delivery of public services in health, education, peace, etc (Table 1). The LGUs are not confined to this list but are in fact encourage to form participatory structures for other sectors such as programs intended to promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people (LGC 1991, Sec 35).

Table 1: Local Special Bodies Required under the Local Government Code	
Local Bodies	Description
Local Development Council (LDC)	The Local Development Council is tasked to assist the corresponding Sanggunian ⁵ in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. It is also tasked to create a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan to be approved by the Sanggunian. A local development council is created down to the barangay level. At the City/Municipal level, it is composed of representatives of NGOs operating in the locality, which should constitute not less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully-organized council and the congressman or his representative. Other members are: the Mayor who heads the Council, all Barangay Chiefs and the chairman of the committee on appropriations of the Sanggunian.
Local School Board (LSB)	<p>The main function of the LSB is to allocate the Special Education Fund (SEF)⁶ to meet the supplementary needs of the local public schools. It also serves as an advisory committee to the Sanggunian concerned on educational matters and recommending changed in the names of public schools within the locality covered for enactment by the Sanggunian.</p> <p>It is headed by the governor/mayor and superintendent of schools as co-chairmen, and as members, the chairman of the education committee of the Sanggunian, the local treasurer, the representative of the pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang kabataan in the Sanggunian, the duly elected president of the local federation of parents-teachers association, the duly elected representative of the teachers' organization, and the duly elected representative of the non-academic personnel of public schools in the locality.</p>
Local Health Board	The Local Health Board is the advisory body on health matters that is concerned with local health agencies on matters such as personnel selection and promotion, bids and awards, grievances and complaints, personnel discipline, budget

⁵ Sanggunian is the local legislative body composed of elected councilors and headed by the Vice-Mayor.

⁶ The Special Education Fund or SEF is a fund collected simultaneously with real property tax. It is an additional 1 percent tax imposed by city/municipal local governments on the assessed value and levy of real properties.

	review, operations review and other similar functions. It is composed of the governor/mayor as chairman and other local officials; a representative from the private sector or NGOs involved in health services, and a representative of the Department of Health.
Local Peace and Order Council (LPOC)	The Local Peace and Order Council is a local special body tasked to aid in maintaining peace, order and public safety, dealing with criminality and insurgency, and curbing illegal gambling activities. Every province, city and municipality is mandated to create a POC. Likewise, every barangay is mandated to create a Barangay Peace and Order Committee (BPOC), which is the implementing arm of the POC. The council is composed of the governor/mayor as chairman, representatives from DILG, DND, DOJ, DSWD, NSC, CHR, National Peace Commission, DDB, AFP and Philippine Constabulary appointed by their respective agency heads, wherever applicable, and three (3) representatives from the private sector to be appointed by the chairman.
Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)	The PBAC is responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of bids, and the recommendation of awards concerning local infrastructure projects. The committee is composed of the municipal mayor as the chairman, a representative of the minority party in the Sanggunian concerned, the local treasurer, two representatives of NGOS that are represented in the local development council concerned, and eleven practicing certified public accountant from the private sector.
Source: 1990 Local Government Code	

Among the noteworthy programs from the local special bodies is the Tree for Legacy program of Nueva Vizcaya (Box 2). The program was developed by the provincial government with the participation of the land occupants (including informal settlers), which has transformed previously denuded uplands and watersheds into communal tree farms and plantations and resulted in a dramatic drop of poverty levels in the province from 52% in 1996 to 10.2% in 2007 (Malayang & Banloi in LGU Position paper; Agbayani 2005). The Tubbataha Reef in Palawan and the Subterranean River Park in Puerto Princesa, through community involvement in the preservation and livelihood in the area, are now considered World Heritage Sites by UNESCO (Box 3). These noteworthy outcomes were possible despite the lack of resources (human, financial and technical) of LGUs (Legaspi 1998). The main strategy was for the LGU to forge partnership with households, non-governmental organizations and peoples' organization in the locality.

Another initiative that resulted from participatory governance through the Local School Board (LSB) is the creation of the *barangay school boards* or *barangay* school governing councils that allowed maximum participation of communities and volunteerism in the management of local public schools. The project was patterned after the Synergeia Education Program, which promote shared visions, clear distribution of responsibilities and accountability among local leaders, teachers and parents. The barangay school board sets policies on discipline and students' welfare; develops and implements School Improvement Programs (SIP); monitors and evaluates SIP; and reports progress of SIP to the SDS and community. The program demonstrated local communities' readiness and capability to manage local public school

system through an effective partnership of local officials and peoples' organizations. The project was started in Naga City, a city with a population of 193,000 people (as of 2015) south of Luzon Island, Philippines and since then have been replicated in other municipalities as well. Today, there are about 250 local governments that have embraced the Synergia program.

It is important to note that LGUs have the flexibility in organizing these special bodies and in the implementation of the governance process. Thus, the level and scope of participation may vary across LGUs. Studies on the participatory governance structures in the Philippines reported that there are cases when participatory governance are effectively carried out while for some, the special bodies are organized or institutionalized but inactive; either there is no effective participation of the citizens or that the local officials are not responsive (UNDP 2007; Manasan 2011; Manasan 2016).

Box 1. Bottom-up Budgeting

Grassroots Participatory Budgeting, formerly known as the Bottom Up Budgeting, is a mechanism introduced under the Aquino Administration in 2012 to promote governance at the local level. It aims to make the planning and budgeting processes more participatory by genuinely involving local CSOs and grassroots communities in the national budget process through the LGUs. Through this process, projects for government funding are more responsive to local needs. The BUB also ensures transparency when it comes to how their cities or municipalities' budget are being spent and gives the people a sense of entitlement that they have a role in the development of their cities/municipalities (Manuel 2015).

The BUB process starts with the cities and municipalities organizing Local Poverty Reduction Action Teams (LPRATs) in their respective localities. CSO assemblies are initially held where CSOs select their representatives to the LPRAT and conduct poverty situation analysis. Other members of the LPRAT are the local chief executive as the head and an equal number of government representatives.

The LPRAT is tasked to formulate and monitor the Local Poverty Reduction Action Plan (LPRAP). This contains programs and projects that will directly address the needs of the poor and marginalized communities in the locality. The LPRAP contains a list of priority projects which are then forwarded for review to the Regional Poverty Reduction Action Team (RPRAT) before it is submitted to the concerned national government agencies to be integrated in their proposed budgets. Lastly, they are forwarded to the Congress and Senate for inclusion in the GAA.

The BUB has two modalities: the regular BUB process for areas not covered by the KALAHI-CIDSS and the enhanced BUB for those that have graduated from or are currently implementing the KALAHI-CIDSS program. The KALAHI-CIDSS, or Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services, is one of the National Government's poverty alleviation programs being implemented by the DSWD whose main objective is also to empower targeted communities and improve local governance by making local governance activities more inclusive or participatory. Both processes generally follow the same flow mentioned but the participatory barangay development process in KALAHI-CIDSS is integrated in the enhanced BUB and the composition of the Local Development Council is enhanced.

Originally, the BUB process was only implemented in the poorest municipalities before eventually being implemented nationwide for the 2015 national budget. Aside from increasing citizen participation in local governance, the BUB also enabled the LGU to finance and implement more projects (Manasan 2016). The BUB experience has been reported to significantly improved community participation, motivation or interest to participate, confidence in their capacity to participate, degree of influence in their barangays, and degree of influence in their municipalities/cities (Manasan et al. 2017). As for the households, they also had positive feedbacks on the BUB projects implemented in their communities in terms of having directly experiencing the impacts (ibid.). However, there were also some who felt that there were more urgent projects than those that were implemented.

Box 2. Tree-for-Legacy

The Tree for Legacy Program is a project of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) with the Provincial LGU of Nueva Vizcaya as part of an effort to explore other approaches to forest management. The program aims to devolve the functions of protecting and managing forest resources from DENR to the LGU coupled with local participation. Nueva Vizcaya serves as the watershed of big dams in the surrounding provinces and has been tagged as the watershed haven of Region 2, which is why forest protection and management is crucial in this area.

In the Tree for Legacy Program, the citizens are mobilized to co-manage the forest by giving them designated areas in the forest lands to plant. It will be the tree planters' responsibility to take care of what they planted and in return, they are given either a "Certificate of Tree Ownership" or "certificate of usufruct" registered with the Register of Deeds. Those given a "Certificate of Tree Ownership" will be allowed to cut and transport their forest products while those granted usufructuary rights will be allowed to harvest the fruits of their trees (DMO No. 2003-09).

Other components of this program are the "Tree for Education" and "Tree for Enterprise". In "Tree for Education," students are encouraged to plant trees in return for receiving regular donations. Also, once their trees mature and are harvested, the proceeds will become their college funds. The "Tree for Enterprise" has the same idea as the "Tree for Legacy" but also for students. Here, the students can be given a "Certificate of Tree Ownership" that will grant them rights to the trees and allow them to sell those for profit.

The project area started with only 500 ha in 1993 but has already expanded to over 2,000 ha and are already being participated by 2,000 individual participants, 205 schools, 205 Parent-teacher Associations, 230 NGOs and POs, and 26 line agencies by 2003 (Elazegui & Combalicer 2004, Agabayani & Tiongson 2003). A significant reduction of poverty in the province by around 40% from 1996 to 2007 was also partly attributed to this project (Malayang & Banlaoi 2007 in LGU position paper). The success of the program is largely attributed to the strong support and active participation of the local community (Bugayong 2006). Granting the people ownership and harvesting right mobilized the citizens to participate in the reforestation effort. The program turned the participants from mere

inhabitants to ‘area managers’ giving them a sense of ownership and at the same time a sense of responsibility to take care of the area (Elazegui & Combalicer 2004).

In the past, the strategy of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya was to issue logging bans and moratoriums and to relocate residence in the area but such approach was met with indifference or resistance (ESSC 2003). Under the Tree for Legacy multi-sectoral approach, forest management and protection in Nueva Vizcaya has been successful; the people supported it mainly because of the co-management strategy. The strategy provided the community the opportunity to directly experience the benefit of conservation efforts and encouraged them to do more (Bugayong 2006). In turn, the government through the DENR and LGU, provides the technical support, issuance of rights and overall monitoring and evaluation of the project.

Box 3. Tubbataha Reef National Park

The Tubbataha Reefs is located in the middle of the Sulu Sea, around 150km from Puerto Princesa, the capital city of Palawan. Due to its inaccessible location, marine life in this area remained undisturbed for hundreds of years until the late 1980s when its resources started to be exploited.

As a response to this, in 1988, President Cory Aquino issued a Presidential Proclamation established the Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park (TRNMP) as a no-take protected area under the management of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) (TMO 2011). In 1990, the DENR collaborated with Tubbataha Foundation Inc., a non-government organization composed of concerned divers and sport fishers, for the management of the park. A multisectoral Board was later created through a local resolution in 1999. The Board known as the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) developed the TRNMP Management Plan, which include among its main principles the collaboration and participation by all stakeholders in the management of the park.

The TPAMB is a multi-sector body composed of 21 representatives from the national, provincial and municipal government, people’s organizations from Cagayancillo, NGOs, local universities and the dive tourism sector (Dygico, et al. 2013). The Board meets quarterly to formulate policies and/or discuss policy issues. Aside from being well-represented, the Board is also in constant communication with the community and are open for their feedback. Local issues and constraints were properly identified and addressed.

Participatory approach in the management of the park has improved the community’s awareness to the values and the rationale of protective measures and encouraged them to support park management. It has instilled in them a sense of stewardship and increased compliance of the community to park regulations including conservation initiatives to the marine environment in general (Dygico, et al. 2013).

Also because of the consistent practice of participatory processes, sharing of resources among the park’s stakeholders has been effectively facilitated. It was crucial that the

TPAMB took into consideration the opportunity cost for the Cagayancillo fishermen of the no-take policy and negotiated a sharing of tourism revenues, not only with them, but with the whole community (Dygico, et al. 2013). This allowed them to share in the benefits derived from the park.

This involvement of the local stakeholders/community in terms of participating in the planning and providing support and receiving shares from the benefits of conservation established in them a sense of entitlement and responsibility to take care of the park and has been a key element to the effective management of the TRNMP (Dygico, et al. 2013).

Source: This summary is based mainly from Dygico, et al.

4. Participatory governance in housing: The Local Housing Board

4.1 Rationale and Legal Basis

The Local Housing Board (LHB) is a recent addition to the local special bodies. Unlike other special boards, the creation of LHB is not a mandatory requirement under UDHA or LGC. There were a number of cities/municipalities that created the LHBs but their functions were elaborated solely by the LGUs and its political leadership. The recognition of the LHB at the national level started in 2008 with the issuance of Executive Order no. 207 (EO 207 s2008). EO 207 ordered the transfer of the clearinghouse function for the eviction and demolition of informal settlements from the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor (PCUP) to the LGUs. As an initial step, LGUs were to create the Local Housing Boards or similar bodies, which would be in charge of the task. Executive Order No.207 remained a clear signal to institutionalize LHBs across different cities and municipalities giving them at least one uniform and legitimate function.

The second legal basis for the creation of LHBs was also introduced in 2008 by the Department of Interior and Local Governance (DILG). The issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2008-143 was prompted by the Supreme Court Mandamus ruling on Manila Bay clean up (G.R No 171947-48). The Supreme Court in its decision dated December 18, 2008 and Resolution dated February 15, 2011 has ordered 13 national government agencies to clean-up, rehabilitate and preserve the Manila Bay based on basic policy of the State as mentioned in the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the Local Government Code “to protect the right of the people to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology.” (MBCRPP 2015 p4). The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), one of the 13 mandamus agencies, was tasked to monitor all local government units (LGUs) that are within the Manila Bay watershed area in terms of key performance indicators. There are 178 cities and municipalities identified to be within the Manila Bay watershed. This includes all 17 cities/ municipalities in the National Capital Region (NCR); 94 cities/municipalities in Regions III; and 67 cities/municipalities in Region IV-A.

One of the key indicators to the rehabilitation of the Manila Bay watershed is the removal of 100 percent of illegal structures built along coastal, shorelines and other waterways. This includes the clearing of informal settlements and the relocation of informal settler families (ISFs), which have increased thousand folds in these areas especially in the NCR. The presence of informal settlements along the Manila Bay area and its tributaries is one of the major causes

of pollution in Manila Bay. Based on the census data of LGUs there is an estimated 213,138 families residing in the area (Figure 1).

The Supreme Court directive has put pressure on the identified cities/municipalities to facilitate the process of relocation. In the same year, thus, DILG directed the LGUs to achieve the desired outputs of the Manila Bay Rehabilitation Program and issued the Memorandum 2008-143 to mandate cities and municipalities particularly 1st to 3rd class municipalities to create and institutionalize their Local Housing Boards (LHBs) that will engage the community in the clearing and resettlement activities.

Memorandum Circular no 2008-143 detailed another aspect of the functioning of the LHB such as their composition and main functions. The LHBs were to include:

- Chairperson, Sanggunian (Local Development Council) Committee on Housing and Urban Development or its equivalent.
- City or Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
- City or Municipal Engineer
- Representative from the Presidential Commission of the Urban Poor
- PO representative
- NGO representative. (DILG, 2008)

The functions of the LHB as specified in the DILG circular include monitoring evictions and demolitions; consultations with the affected families; and compliance with the pre-relocation guidelines specified in the law. Ultimately the LHB is the only institution in a municipality or city that has the legitimacy to issue Certificate of Compliance (CoC) – a document necessary to proceed with a relocation of informal settlers in public lands and those owned by government agencies.⁷ Under the UDHA, LGUs and government agencies have to go through the court process before eviction and relocation can be undertaken in public lands. With LHB, the government agencies need not go to the regular courts since the decisions of the LHB is legally binding. The CoCs have similar legal power as that of a court order to satisfy the requirement of the UDHA.

Aside from the legislative basis for the creation of the Local Housing Board, the planning environment also pushed for the necessity of establishing LHBs in every city and municipality in the country. Both Philippine Development Plans for the years 2011-2016 and 2017-2021 urged the LGUs to establish LHBs as a mechanism to accelerate decision-making and housing services delivery. Likewise, the Local Shelter Planning Manual of the Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council (HUDCC) also indicated the establishment of the LHB as a necessary step in the development of the local plans. This kind of supportive documents extended on the nominal functions of the LHB as outlined in the Memorandum Circular no. 2008-143, although typically they did not impose these functions legally. However, some of new shelter programs realized in Metro Manila enforced the establishment of the Local Housing Board as a pre-requisite for accessing fund or programmatic support by specific LGUs. Such was the case of Micro-Medium Rise Buildings modality of the DILG, which additionally required the Boards to ‘bring to at least 50% voting membership of the Board from the PO project proponents’ (DILG, 2015). Overall, the LGUs received numerous impulses

⁷ In the case of private lands occupied by informal settlers, the owners have to go through the court process.

which incentivized them to move forward with the development of Local Housing Board. However, having no actual obligation to assume other legal functions except of dealing with relocations and issuance of CoC not all LGUs decided on the progressive composition or tasks of their LHBs.

An attempt to systematize the functioning of the LHBs is being proposed under Senate Bill No.893 ‘An Act Creating a Local Housing Board’ in All Cities and First to Third Class Municipalities, Providing for its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes’. The Bill did not envisage significant changes in the composition and power distribution of the LHB prescribing majority of the places to public sector representatives. A minor revision is the inclusion of a representative of a private organization engaged in subdivision and housing development in the locality. However, a significant change is being proposed in relation to the powers and functions of the Local Housing Board. Those envisaged are:

- recommending directives, rules and regulations to the Sanggunian, preparation of Local Shelter Plans,
- approving preliminary and final subdivision schemes and development plans of subdivisions and condominiums,
- approving subdivision schemes and plans for all economic and socialized housing projects as well as building occupancy permits,
- evaluating and resolving the opposition to the issuance of development permits,
- designating one representative to the Local Development Council,
- recommending the sites for socialized housing,
- advising Sanggunian on matters of local taxation in relation to socialized housing programs
- recommending for approval of Local Chief Executives (LCE) schemes for acquisition and dispossession of lands for socialized housing purposes,
- recommending to LCE partnership arrangements concerning delivery of affordable shelter,
- reporting and delivery of other LGU functions as prescribed by the UDHA (Congress of the Philippines, 2016)

The proposed ordinance includes the idea of creation or converting responsible existing offices into the Local Housing Office, which would serve as an implementing arm of the Local Housing Board. Additionally, it provides financial mechanism and division of responsibilities of various shelter and urban poor affairs agencies concerning the functioning of LHB.

Table 2: Relevant National Laws, Legislations, Development Plans Supporting Creation and Strengthening of LHB

<p>National laws / Basis for the creation of Local Housing Boards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Sections 9 and 10 • Local Government Code of 1991: Section 2, Sections 3(b), Section 17(a), Section 18 • Urban Housing and Development Act of 1992: Section 2 (e), Section 39 • Executive order no 708, s. 2008 • DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2008-143, Creation of Local Housing Boards
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DILG M N.2009-05 (Amending MC. 2009-143)
<p>Selected documents strengthening the LHBs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 Chapter 8 / Philippine Development Plan Mid-Term Review • DILG Memorandum Circular 2015-56: Guidelines for the implementation of DILG Micro-Medium Rise buildings (MMRB) projects by LGUs • Philippine Development Plan 2017-2021, Chapter 12 Building Safe and Secure Communities • Local Shelter Planning Manual of the Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council – 2016
<p>Pending legislation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senate Bill no. 893: Creating a Local Housing Board in all cities and first to third class municipalities, providing for its powers and functions and for other purposes - 2016

4.2 Institutionalization of LHB in Cities and Municipalities

The legislation that strengthened the creation of the LHB covered specifically cities and 1st to 3rd class municipalities having informal settlers and located outside of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This focus on urbanized areas is due to the observed association between the level of urbanization and magnitude of informal settlements in the country. The official data on the number of informal settlements does not reflect the current pervasiveness of informal settlements but the pattern of distribution show that the bulk of ISFs are in highly urbanizing cities particularly Metro Manila.⁸ Based on the 2015 housing census, 41.12% of the total population of ISFs in the Philippines reside in highly urbanized cities (HUCs) and about 58% of ISFs in HUCs live in Metro Manila (Table 3). Of the 33 HUCs, majority (25 cities) have institutionalized the LHB through their respective local ordinance.


Currently, there is no government agency that monitors LHB compliance of LGUs. DILG monitors mainly the 178 cities and municipalities around the Manila Bay watershed to ensure that the desired outputs of the Supreme Court Mandamus on Manila Bay are achieved. DILG considers the LHBs as an important mechanism to facilitate the clearing of informal housing settlements along the Manila Bay watershed area. Among the 178 LGUs, only 123 LGUs complied with the DILG directive to institutionalized LHB through a local ordinance (Table 4). The LGUs that did not comply were largely the municipalities. These municipalities did not see the urgency to establish LHBs because the problem of ISFs is not yet a pressing concern in the locality. Usually, ISFs in these municipalities are contained in a specific area and given the limited role of the LHB and its focus on relocation activities, expectedly some

⁸ The National Housing Authority reported in 2011 a total of over 1.5 million ISFs in the Philippines with over 500 thousand ISFs in Metro Manila. The difference in count with the official statistics is due to definition adopted by the official statistics that consider ISFs mainly in terms of “consent” to the occupancy of property. The official statistics do not consider whether the “consent” was given by legitimate owners.

cities/municipalities see no pressing need for an LHB. In the case of Metro Manila where the proliferation of ISFs is evident, all cities including the lone municipality within Metro Manila complied with the DILG directive to institutionalize LHBs in their respective localities.

However, compliance does not reflect the effectiveness of participatory governance. As reflected in the table, some LHBs were established mainly on paper but are either not active or the Board does not conduct regular meetings. Some LHBs lack the required number of members while others have no regular representatives from the civil society or the community.

Figure 1: DILG map



Source: Map from DILG Manila Bay Project Management Office

Table 3: HUCS with Institutionalized LHBs

	Number of ISFs*	% ISF to total no. of HHs	With LHB**
National Capital Region (excluding Pateros)	123,782	3.98	Y
Baguio City	1,436	1.60	N
Angeles City	3,313	3.44	Y
Olongapo City	323	0.57	N
Lucena City	2,694	4.50	N
Puerto Pincasa City	3,876	6.23	Y
Iloilo City	6,581	6.92	Y
Bacolod City	12,543	9.72	N
Cebu City	9,776	4.57	Y
Lapu-Lapu City	4,627	4.65	N
Mandaue City	4,670	4.94	N
Tacloban city	2,261	4.47	N
Zamboanga City	6,053	3.12	Y
Iligan City	1,937	2.53	Y
Cagayan De Oro City	8,825	5.41	Y
Davao City	15,670	3.82	Y
General Santos City	6,112	4.23	Y
Butuan City	3,347	4.39	N
Total ISFs in HUCs	217,826	4.17	
Total ISFs in HUCs (excluding NCR)	94,044	4.45	
PHILIPPINES	529,751	2.31	
% of ISFs in HUCs to Total ISFs in the Philippines = 41.12%			
% of ISFs in NCR to Total ISFs in HUCs = 56.83%			

Source: Data from CPH 2015; Information on presence of LHB was individually checked on the websites of the LGUs. Institutionalized LHBs are those LGUs with approved Sanggunian Ordinance creating the LHB.

NCR = consists of 16 highly urbanized cities (HUCs)

*Definition of Informal Settlers- number of households owning house rent-free lot without consent of owner and those in rent-free house and lot without consent of owner

Table 4: LHB Compliance of Cities/Municipalities Covered in the MBCRPP (as of 2016)

Region	Number of ISFs	% ISF to total population	# of Cities/ Municipalities	With LHB			No LHB**	
				Rating***				Total # with LHB
				1	3	5		
Metro Manila								
Cities	63,694	2.1	16		6	10	16	0
Municipality	2,029	14.3	1		1		1	0

Region 3**								
Cities	5,710	0.9	12			5	5	7
Municipalities	95,400	7.0	82		19	15	34	48
Region 4								
Cities	26,515	2.1	12		2	10	12	
Municipalities	19,790	1.9	55	1	12	41	54	1*

Source: Authors summary of DILG report on Number of ISFs and LHBs from DILG Manila Bay Clean-up, Rehabilitation, and Preservation Program Report. The number of ISFs reflects only ISFs that occupies danger areas or along rivers, creeks and bodies of water. Proportion of ISF was computed using Number of Households from 2015 Census of Population and Housing (CPH)

*The Municipality of Rizal was given a rating of N/A for Category 3. ISFs and the Development of LSP & RRAP

**No LHB or no report given

***Type refers to rating based on the Manila Bay Clean-up, Rehabilitation and Preservation Program (MBCRPP) LGU Compliance Reports. Meaning of Rating:

1 = There is an LHB created thru an ordinance, but lacks in the required number of officers and does not conduct regular board performance tasks

3 = There is an LHB created thru an ordinance, completed with required officers but does not conduct regular board performance tasks

5 = There is an LHB created thru an ordinance, completed with required officers and conducts regular board performance tasks

5. Case study of LHBs in Metro Manila

Metro Manila is an important case study area for LHB because of the magnitude of ISFs and the limited relocation sites for socialized housing within Metro Manila. Thus, relocation often involves off city resettlements resulting in major displacement of families. Off city resettlements often result in resistance to relocate because of possible adverse socioeconomic impact. The LHB provides the mechanism to engage the community and develop resettlement projects or options designed to lessen adverse effects and provide better opportunities for the affected families.

Given that relocation are mainly happening in Metro Manila, we examined the effectiveness of participatory governance in the LHBs of three cities in Metro Manila. The case study LGUs are: (1) Quezon City; (2) Manila City and (3) Pasig City. These cities represent areas with institutionalized LHB with rating of either “3” or “5” (see Table 4). The cities also represents three key cities located in different parts of Metro Manila (i.e. north, east and west of Metro Manila).⁹

The three cities have a significant number of ISFs with Quezon City having to deal with higher number of ISFs due to its bigger size (Table 5). Quezon City has also the highest percentage of families living in informal settlements among the cities in Metro Manila. Manila City comes next while Pasig City’s ISF population is only about 1% of total families in the City. The ISFs of Pasig City are also concentrated along the Pasig River, which makes Pasig City critical to maintaining ecological balance in the Manila Bay. Based on official ISF data, the decline in the number of ISFs in these cities from 2010 to 2015 have been slow and have even increased

⁹ We also selected Pasay City, located at the southern part of Metro Manila but the LGU did not respond to our request for data and follow-up interviews after the initial meeting.

especially in the City of Manila and in Quezon City. However, ISFs population in the areas covered by the Manila Bay watershed have registered significant decline. DILG reports that 11% of the target ISFs in waterways of Quezon City has been relocated (Table 6). Pasig City showed the highest performance with 31% of the ISFs in the danger areas removed. In Manila City, about 18% of the ISFs in danger areas have been moved out of the area.

Table 5 ISF Population in Metro Manila

	2015 CPH	% to total # of HHs	% change from 2007	% change from 2010
NCR	123,782	4.00	-3.15	36.81
Caloocan City	8,162	2.22	77.98	-5.80
Las Pinas City	3,723	2.62	83.94	36.42
Makati City	1,358	0.88	-45.48	-58.43
Malabon City	8,527	9.89	53.39	201.63
Mandaluyong City	3,651	3.64	130.35	167.47
Manila City	21,108	4.85	1.62	28.43
Marikina City	718	0.73	94.58	-20.49
Muntinlupa City	3,074	2.51	-22.41	35.72
Navotas City	4,697	7.71	48.12	62.41
Paranaque City	8,960	5.49	-13.25	19.69
Pasay City	1,062	0.99	-70.45	-57.71
Pasig City	1,974	1.09	-0.75	-10.15
Quezon City	49,586	7.26	-23.46	59.25
San Juan City	394	1.37	63.38	-18.60
Taguig City	3,276	1.65	332.19	-11.05
Valenzuela City	3,512	2.29	119.36	133.36
Pateros	100	0.70	-2.91	-20.00

Source: Data from 2007 Census of Population; 2010 & 2015 Census of Population and Housing

Note: Definition of Informal Settlers- households living in rent-free houses without consent of owner

Table 6. Accomplishment of Metro Manila in the relocation of ISFs occupying Manila Bay watershed areas

NCR	Total number of ISFs in Danger areas (NHA 2011 data)	ISF Cleared (as of 2015)	% of ISFs cleared
Caloocan	2,129	267	12.5%
Las Piñas	2,161	0	0.0%
Makati	671	848	126.4%
Malabon	1,849	782	42.3%
Mandaluyong	1031	90	8.7%
Manila	26,029	4,866	18.7%
Marikina	386	-	-
Muntinlupa	3,428	-	-

Navotas	6,652	-	-
Parañaque	3320	2202	66.3%
Pasay	4,200	3310	78.8%
Pasig	4,173	1315	31.5%
Quezon City	31,275	3522	11.3%
San Juan	5,238	553	10.6%
Taguig	5,439	575	10.6%
Valenzuela	4,261	571	13.4%
Pateros	1,977	-	-
Total	104,219	18,901	18.14%

Source: NHA 2011 Data, Manila Bay Clean Up KPI Results from DILG

Note: No data on ISFs cleared for Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas and Pateros

5.1 Mandate and Composition of LHB in case LGUs

5.1.1. Mandate of the LHB

All three cities institutionalized their LHB through the issuance of *Sanggunian* Resolution or City Ordinance. In the case of Quezon City, the LHB local ordinance was issued in 2002 while for Pasig and Manila their LHB ordinances were issued in 2009. However, for the three cities, organizing the LHB took some time. For instance, in Quezon City records of regular meetings was reported only in 2011. For Manila and Pasig, the LHB was convened around 2013 and 2012, respectively.

With regard to the role of LHB, the cities of Pasig and Manila adopted the mandate of LHB as stated in the DILG Memo 2008-143. The LHB in both cities were established to be the sole clearinghouse for eviction and demolition activities of ISFs. The functions of their LHB as stated in their respective ordinances are: (1) monitor all evictions and demolitions in cooperation with other concerned agencies; (2) issuance of Certificates of Compliance (CoCs); and (3) ensure all the requirements for eviction and demolition as under UDHA are met.

As for the Local Housing Board of Quezon City, the role of the LHB has been expanded to overall housing development in the City. In addition to the being the demolition clearinghouse, the Quezon City Housing Board (QCHB) is also tasked with formulating, developing, and ensuring the implementation of policies on the provision of housing and resettlement areas. The functions of the QCHB explicitly stated in the ordinance are: (1) recommend local shelter plans, (2) assist in the formulation of amendments to the QC land use plan, (3) monitor the progress of land developments projects approved by the Sanggunian, (4) ensure compliance with the balanced housing requirement, (5) identify lands for socialized housing, (6) advise the Sanggunian on matters of local taxation and allocation that affects the local government socialized housing program, (7) recommend for the acquisition and disposition of funds within Q.C. for socialized housing purposes, (8) recommend for approval of the local chief executives partnership arrangements with the NHA, (9) coordinate with national government housing agencies, (10) ensure the registration of underprivileged and homeless families as beneficiaries, (11) coordinate with national government entities involved in housing and urban development, and (12) submit to the president and the congress an annual report on the implementation of UDHA.

5.1.2 Composition of the LHB

Based on legislation, the LHB is to be headed by the city or municipal Mayor. The other members of the Board are representatives from the local and national government housing and related agencies and representatives from the peoples' organizations and civil society.

For Quezon City, the Housing Board is composed of: the Vice Mayor as the Vice Chairman of the Board, the head of the Urban Poor Affair Office as the Board Secretary, 5 representatives of duly accredited POs, 2 representatives of duly accredited NGO, 5 members from the City Office appointed by the Mayor, 2 representatives of the City Development Council, and a representative from the HUDCC appointed by their respective Chair (Figure 2). For the POs and NGOs representatives, the Mayor chooses who sits in the Board from among the accredited POs and NGOs in the City. POs or NGOs representatives who are already members of the City Development Council are not qualified to membership in the LHB. PO representatives are taken from each of the five Districts in Quezon City. There is one representative for each District except for District II, which has 2 representatives due to its size. The membership of the Board show that more than 50% of members are PO and NGO representatives.

In Pasig City, the Vice Chair is the *Sangguniang Panglungsod* Chairperson of the Housing and Urban Development Committee. The other government representatives are the City Engineer, City Building Official, City Planning and Development Officer, the head of the Pasig Housing Regulatory Unit (PHRU), the head of the City Urban Poor Services Office, a representative from NHA and a representative from the PCUP (Figure 3). There is only one representative each from duly accredited PO and NGO. There are no fixed PO representatives to the Board. The PO representative who attends the Board meeting depends on whether the community they represent are included in the agenda for that meeting. However, it is not only the PO President who attends but other officers of their organizations can join the Board meeting as well. As for the NGO representatives, there is fixed representation and the Mayor appoints the NGO representative to sit in the Board.

As for the Manila City Housing Board, the Vice Chair is the Chairman of the City Council Committee on Housing, Land, Urban Planning Development and Resettlement (Figure 4). Other members are the City Planning and Development Officer, City Engineer, City Urban Settlements Officer, a representative from the PCUP, a representative from the NHA, a number of representatives from POs not less than one-fourth of the members of the fully organized board, and a number of representatives from NGOs not less than one-fourth of the members of the fully organized board. The City Urban Settlements Office serves as the secretariat of the Board. In particular, the PO and NGO representatives in the Board are selected from among POs operating in the city and SEC-registered NGOs operating in the city, respectively. The City Urban Settlements Office gathers all eligible representatives of POs and NGOS in the city. These representatives will then choose among themselves who will be members of the Board. The PO and NGO representatives in the City Development Council can also be the PO and NGO representatives in the Board.

Figure 2. Pasig City Housing Board




Figure 3. Pasig City Housing Board





Figure 4. Manila City Housing Board



5.2 LHB Decision-Making Process

The decision-making process in LHB is an important aspect of participatory governance. As provided in the previous section, we observed that the LGUs have applied the prescribed legislative frameworks of the DILG Memo 2008-143 differently. For instance, the functions of the QCHB are broader than those of the Housing Boards of Pasig and Manila. Moreover, Quezon City also expanded the prescribed composition of the Board by including bigger number of representatives from the NGOs and People's Organizations. A critical feature of the QCHB is that the POs and NGOs are positioned as majority voting members of the Boards. Representatives of Key Shelter Agencies have no voting rights but are considered as observers in the Board. The inclusion and acceptance of the POs representatives in the decision-making process is reflected in the approved Board Resolution where we found the signatures of all PO representatives. In addition, a pre-meeting of the LHB, which is presided by the Vice Chair is included in the process to enable other members of the affected communities to hear the discussions among LHB members. This practice also allows for detailed discussions on the issues and concerns of the affected community before the recommendations are decided upon in the regular or main LHB meetings. These processes show that a good relationship has been developed between the Quezon City government and the PO representatives and that participatory governance actually works in the City. The POs noted that this good relationship has resulted in more voluntary relocations (i.e. violent demolition has been rare) because the people are consulted and the PO representatives are themselves trusted in their respective districts.

In the case of Pasig and Manila Housing Boards, the participation of the POs and NGOs in the decision making process is minimal. All Board members are voting members. Since POs and

NGOs representation are usually considered as one vote each, the majority in the Board are the local and national government officials. Decisions are approved and Board Resolutions are drafted even without the signature of the POs and/or NGOs for as long as majority of members signed the Resolution. POs and/or NGOs see the LHB process as simply compliance to the requirement of consultation with no real participation of the community. Interviews with POs officers in both cities showed that there are only very few meetings with the LHBs. In cases when they are called for a meeting, they discussed mainly matters on livelihood support and other relocation assistance. For POs in Manila, they prefer to approach directly the City Housing Office and the Office of the Mayor to get support for the community's housing plan then present them in LHB meetings. They consider the direct approach a more effective mechanism than the LHB.

The low importance given to the process of participatory governance in LHB is also reflected in the meetings undertaken to discuss housing issues. While QCHB have pre conference meetings in addition to the regular LHB meetings; Pasig and Manila Housing Boards have no regular meetings. The meetings are dependent on "need" or when eviction and relocation have to be implemented. In particular, Pasig City prefers to course the process through the Local Interagency Action Committee (LIAC) an *ad hoc* committee created when there is a need for eviction and relocation. The LHB is considered only when the LIAC or schemes for voluntary relocation fails. The LHB is then convened for the issuance of CoCs so that eviction and demolition can be executory. The CoC serves as a court order and a legal document that signifies that a consultative process have been undertaken with the affected communities and that adequate relocation options have been provided. A similar process is done in Manila City. The LHB is merely an avenue to comply with the provision of UDHA, which require adequate consultations with the affected families as well as adequate relocation facilities and processes.

The importance of LHBs in the housing governance of the three cities can also be reflected in the funding given for the operations of the Board. Only QCHB has a separate line budget for LHB operations of the cities. The budget, which is at P5M per year also includes honorarium paid to PO representatives. No honorarium is given to representatives of the local and national government. In the case of Pasig and Manila, there are no separate budget items for their LHBs. In Manila City, although the Ordinance authorized a budget for LHB to be taken from 1% of the IRA, this was not implemented. Expenses for LHB meetings are subsumed in the operation of the housing divisions in Manila as well as in Pasig. No honorarium is also provided to Board members.

Table 7 provides a summary of the key features of LHB in the case LGUs.

Table 7: Key Features of the LHB in case LGUs

	Quezon City	Pasig City	Manila City
Sangguniang Ordinance Creating LHB	Ordinance #1111 s2002	Ordinance #14 s2009	Ordinance # 8185 s2009
Date LHB Formally convened	2011	2013	2012
Mandate of the LHB	Formulate, develop, and ensure the implementation of policies on the provision of housing and	Sole clearinghouse for eviction and demolition activities	Sole clearinghouse for eviction and demolition activities

	resettlement areas, and the observance of the right of the underprivileged and homeless to a just and humane eviction and demolition	of ISF in danger areas, public places, government projects	of ISF in danger areas, public places, government projects
Membership of LHB	Chaired by the Mayor with 16 members composed of 2 City Officials; 6 duly accredited POs; 2 duly accredited NGOs; 2 members from the City Development Council; 5 members to be appointed by Mayor; 1 representative from the National Government	Chaired by Mayor with 10 members composed of 6 City officials; 2 representatives from national government agencies; 1 duly registered PO representative and 1 duly registered NGO representative.	Chaired by the Mayor with 10 members; 4 City officials; 2 from national government agencies; at least 2 duly registered POs; and 2 duly registered NGOs.
Selection of POs and NGOs representative	- Mayor selects from registered POs and NGOs in Quezon City. PO representatives are different from those in the City Development Council	-Selected by the affected community; No fixed PO representative. -NGO representatives are appointed by the Mayor	-POs or NGOs in the City Development Council can also be the representatives in the LHB
Meetings per year	Monthly Pre-LHB meetings plus 4 regular (main) LHB meetings a year	Not regular; LHB convenes based on need. Prefers to use LIAC; LHB as last resort	Not regular; LHB convenes only when there is an application for CoC
Quorum	POs as the majority NGA representatives are non-voting	50+1 (PO may not sign resolution)	50 +1 (PO may not sign resolution)
Budget for LHB	-Annual funding of P5 Million for LHB operational expenses -Honorarium provided to PO representatives; none for local and national government Board representatives	- PHRU authorized to provide budget for LHB. Expenses for travelling, representation and other allowances are provided	- With authorized budget but unfunded. LHB operations is subsumed in the City Housing Division - No honorarium given to the Board

5.3 Delivery of Housing Services

The effectiveness of the LHB may also be gauge from the results arising from the LHB meetings and in the delivery of housing services to the ISFs.

5.3.1 Quezon City Public Housing Programs

In 2011, when the QCHB was formally convened, Quezon City local housing office conducted a census of ISFs in the City to serve as the baseline for the City's local shelter plan. From 2001 to 2016, Quezon City was able to reduce the total number of ISFs in the city by 16 percent specifically those residing in government priority areas, open spaces and private properties (Table 8). However, the ISFs in danger areas and waterways are still growing.

The City through the LHB has approved 137 CoCs from 2012 to 2017 covering several ISF communities (Table 9). However, the approved CoCs may not be implemented outright or that their implementation deferred usually due to the readiness of the affected families to relocate. These outputs from the LHB support the POs contention of openness and democracy in the conduct of Board meetings. It also shows that despite approval, the implementation can be deferred and in cases when the CoCs are not implemented within the prescribed period of three months, the CoCs go through a renewal process. On the other hand, the processes of CoC approval and possibilities of deferment and allowance for renewal, imply that when eviction orders are implemented, there is less resistance and violent clashes between ISFs and police are avoided.

Aside from the approval of CoC's, the QCHB has been the venue for the approval of major housing ordinances: (a) the adoption of the City's updated Shelter Plan; (b) the establishment of the Socialized Housing Fund; and (c) the creation of the housing finance programs for housing projects of the City. In particular, the Socialized housing fund is generated from socialized housing tax, idle land tax, and all proceeds from all housing programs of the city. These funds are utilized solely for housing purposes. The socialized housing and idle land taxes are the main sources of funding for the housing program of the City. On the average, collection from socialized housing and idle taxes amount to P250 Million and P70 Million annually.

Moreover, the City's Housing Program has strongly supported community housing programs such as (Table 10): (1) the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), a mortgage financing program of the national government which assists legally organized associations of underprivileged and homeless citizens to purchase and develop a tract of land under the concept of community ownership. The LGU supports the program as mobilizers of the community and the LHB has been the venue for the approval of CMP Projects. (2) Direct sale program which allows the ISFs occupying city-owned property to acquire the lot they occupy by way of direct payment to the City government through monthly amortization for 25 years.

Table 8. Magnitude of ISFs in Quezon City

LOCATION	Year						% change from 2011- 2016
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
	Total No. of ISFs						
I. Private Properties	102,946	100,783	91,983	93,167	92,026	91,871	-10.76
II. Danger Areas/ Waterways/ Infrastructure	31,840	40,909	45,649	48,927	49,310	46,477	45.97
III. Government Projects (+ Area	15,664	15,484	15,897	17,538	15,907	15,832	1.07

Priority Development)							
IV. Government Priorities	77,581	35,453	34,203	34,212	35,426	36,831	-52.53
V. Open Space	2,663	2,658	2,974	2,974	2,392	2,392	-10.18
TOTAL	230,694	195,287	190,706	196,818	195,061	193,403	-16.16

Source: HCDRD Census

Table 9. Summary of CoCs Approved and Renewed: Quezon City

Year	Approved	Deferred	Renewed
2012	8	3	-
2013	14	4	8
2014	29	6	5
2015	30	12	33
2016	18	6	112
2017	38	0	125
Total	137	31	283

Source: Minutes of QCHB Meetings

Note: Details of COCs approved and renewed can be found in Appendix A

Table 10. Quezon City Housing Program Accomplishments (1990 – 2017)

Intervention	# of Projects	# of Beneficiaries	Collection Efficiency Rating (CER) (as of Q1 of 2017)
CMP			
Mobilizer			
LGU-QC	286	12,985	108.63%
Others	226	12,245	
Direct Sale Program	28	6,102	108.48%
Direct Sale	21	5,790	
Bistekville	7	312	
Resettlement Program	-	*39,305	
Socialized Housing Program	37	**7,320	
In-House			169.19%
SHFC			128.54%
Pag-IBIG			146.75%
TOTAL	605	84,059	

Source: Data from HCDRD Presentation on Socialized Housing Program of Quezon City

*Number of Families

**Number of units

5.3.2 Pasig City Public Housing Programs

Prior to 2011, the City of Pasig dealt with the ISFs in the city through a combination of housing interventions, such as: Zonal Improvement program, Community Mortgage Program (CMP), in city and off city relocation, and *balik-probinsya* program.¹⁰ In those early years, over 9,000 ISFs have benefited from these programs (Pasig City Shelter Plan 2014-2017). The City focused its activities on ISFs occupying the waterways starting 2009 and has mobilized its resources to relocate some 2,639 ISFs in a period of two years, 2009-2010 (Table 11). While the LHB has already been institutionalized at that time (2009), the City did not have to resort to the LHB since the ISFs were open to being relocated. This was attributed to two major events that occurred in 2008; one, the massive flooding in the area that resulted from Typhoon Ondoy; and two, the final and executory ruling of the Supreme Court on the cleaning up of Manila Bay. The LIAC was used as the mechanism to implement the “voluntary” relocation. The bulk of the ISFs in the waterways were relocated off city resettlement areas, in particular, Calauan, Laguna and Tanay, Rizal.

However, the relocation of families in these areas slowed down under the Aquino administration. During the period 2011-2016, participatory governance was given emphasis in government housing program. This policy required the housing agencies including LGUs to give optimum consideration to the “Peoples’ Plan” in cases of relocation. The Peoples Plan refers to a housing plan proposed by the affected community wherein the settlers themselves “identify, conceptualize, plan, design, develop, and manage their shelter projects” (DILG 2014 p.1). The City of Pasig has to convene the LHB since the ISFs were reluctant to negotiate and they use the “People’s Plan” as an excuse to delay relocation. While there were some ISFs that were able to submit their Peoples Plan, the beneficiaries are small in number and the ISF community themselves have difficulty in getting the consensus of all affected families. This has also resulted in factions within communities. During the period 2011-2016, a total of 1,840 families were relocated or an average of only 306 families per year.

Under the current Duterte administration, the Peoples’ Plan approach has been diminished but the legal requirements for eviction and relocation under UDHA continue to be enforced. The LHB thus becomes an important mechanism to conduct consultative approaches with affected communities. In particular, the City does not see the need to engage the LHB in local shelter planning. The Local Shelter Plan is developed by the City Housing Office in partnership with other relevant City offices such as the Engineering Department and the Mayor’s Office. The current powers of the LHB as the clearing house for eviction and relocation of ISFs is considered sufficient and convening the Board becomes necessary only in cases of involuntary relocation. In the past two years, the City has convened the LHB primarily for ISFs occupying the Manggahan Floodway (Table 12). There are only about 3,000 ISFs remaining in the area. The remaining ISFs have been resisting relocation and it has been difficult to convene the community because there are several leaders and the community is in risk of intrusion by professional squatters.

However, unlike most cities in Metro Manila that simply provide a resettlement sites to relocated ISF, the City of Pasig implements a complete resettlement package for ISF communities relocated at the urban fringes. The City of Pasig forms a partnership with the

¹⁰ Families that do not pass the requirements for housing benefits are given financial assistance to cover their transport costs for moving back to their respective provinces.

receiving LGUs to enable the latter to support the needs of the relocated ISF communities. In particular, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is signed with receiving LGUs for the provision of infrastructure and other facilities needed by the receiving LGUs in administering to the needs of the newly resettled communities. As shown in Table 13, the assistance includes both physical and social infrastructures and capital equipment amounting to millions of pesos. Moreover, although the MOA is only for 5 years, Pasig can still provide support when necessary. To finance this program, Pasig City *Sanggunian* has approved in the City Revenue Code the collection of the social housing tax equivalent to 0.5% of assessed value of properties P1.5M and above for socialized housing projects. This current strategy of Pasig is considered one of the best practices for cities that relocate their ISFs in areas outside of their administrative boundaries and in 3rd to 5th class municipalities.

Table 11. Relocated Families in Pasig, 2009-2016

Year	No. of Relocated Families
2009	1,177
2010	1,462
2011	55
2012	505
2013	235
2014	285
2015	355
2016	405
Total (2009-2016)	4,479
Total (2011-2016/	1,840
Baseline (2011)	4,173

Source of Data: NHA 2011, Pasig City Best Practices PowerPoint from PHRU

Table 13. Summary of CoCs Approved: Pasig City

Year	Location	No. of Families/Structures Affected	Proponent
2017	Clearing of structures on the East Berm Area of the Manggahan Floodway Channel in Bgy. Sta. Lucia, Pasig City	667 ISFs	City Engineering/Pasig LGU
2018	Clearing of Manggahan Floodway Channel West Berm Area (Bgy. Maybunga & Bgy. Rosario)	1,762 structures, 2,792 ISFs	City Engineering/Pasig LGU

Source: Data from PHRU

Note: Details on CoCs approved can be found in Appendix B and C

Table 13. Summary of Assistance Given by Pasig City in Off-city Relocations (as of 2017)

Off-city Relocation (to Southville 7, Calauan, Laguna)			
Assistance given to Relocatees	Assistance given to Southville 7	Assistance given to Calauan LGU	Assistance given to host brgy.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provision of winged van trucks for the relocatees' belongings• Provision of airconditioned buses• Php 15,000 Livelihood Assistance• Installation of Public Faucets• Giving of 4 units GenSets• Yearly giving of pamaskong handog	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 3-Storey (15 Classrooms) School Building & Covered Basketball court (Php 38,297,955.00)• Livelihood Caravan (includes Medical, Optical, Dental Mission and Livelihood Program)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Donation of Php 1.3 Million for the construction of cemetery	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Donation of ambulance
Near-city Relocation (to Southville 10, Tanay, Rizal)			
No. of units: 2,162 units			
Assistance given to Relocatees	Assistance given to Southville 10	Other assistance provided	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Aircon buses for the transportation of relocatees• Provision of winged van/trucks• Loading of belongings to trucks with assistance of BCEO, action line and MMDA• Bags of groceries and packed lunch provided to relocatees• Giving of Php 10,000.00 financial livelihood assistance• Yearly giving of Pamaskong Handog• Medical, Dental and Optical Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pasig City Government released Php 140 Million as funding for 500 qualified families for relocation• Initial Deliveries of potable water during the first 5 months of relocation to Southville 10• Concreting of 320.00 km access road• Construction of security outpost• Construction of 3-storey classroom bldg. High School Building (Php 20,278,000.00)• Donation of various furniture and school supplies• City donated vehicles: ambulance, service vehicles, mini dump truck, rescue vehicle• Donated equipment for livelihood programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Salaries of 26 teachers• Salaries of other personnel• Allowances of security personnel• Garbage collection and disposal expenses• Gas/Oil & Maintenance of Garbage Trucks• Tree Planting Activities with LIAC of Pasig and Pasig City Biker's Club	
Near-city Relocation II (Eastshine Residences, Tanay, Rizal)			
No. of units: 2,482 untis			
Assistance given to Relocatees		Assistance provided to Tanay LGU	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aircon buses for transportation of relocates • Provision of winged van/trucks • Loading of belongings to trucks with assistance of BCEO, action line and MMDA • Bags of groceries and packed lunch provided to relocates • Giving of Php 10,000.00 financial livelihood assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction & concreting of access road • Construction of Super Health Center (Php 36,128,582.00)
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Source: Pasig City Best Practices 2017 PowerPoint from PHRU

5.3.3 Manila City Public Housing Programs

The primary mandate of Manila City housing office is to implement the “Land for the Landless Program”. The Land for the Landless housing program is incorporated in the law creating the City of Manila (RA 409/Revised Charter of the City of Manila) in 1949. Thus, the Manila housing office until now is designed to operate on the basis of this program. In particular, the program is targeted to privately owned lands occupied by many families for several years but not necessarily informal settlers since some families pays the rent for the land. The land occupied by the settlers may be expropriated by the City government through an Expropriation Ordinance whereby the City buys the land from the current owners at fair market price to be amortized by the settlers for 30 years. The prerequisite is for the families to organize themselves and request their representative councilor for sponsorship of the expropriation.

The task to relocate ISFs is undertaken by the office mainly as compliance to UDHA but there is no specific funding provided for relocation and resettlement programs. Given the absence of funding from the city, the clearing of ISFs in danger areas, waterways and public places has been limited. Most targets of ISF clearing operations have not been achieved even under the Oplan Likas¹¹ program of the Aquino administration that provided P50 Billion funds for relocation and resettlement of ISFs in priority sites (Table 14).

Moreover, the LHB is convened only when there are available funds for eviction and demolition. For the period 2014 to 2016, the LHB issued only 7 CoCs in government properties that affect specific government infrastructure projects. Manila City relies mainly on the other government agencies e.g. MMDA, DPWH, Ports Authority, National Housing Authority, etc. to finance relocation activities (Table 15). They can provide some funds but this is *ad hoc* and is taken from the budget of the Office of the Mayor.

The situation in the City of Manila shows that they are not really equipped to expand their housing program. The LHB is not incorporated to their main housing program which is the Land for the Landless or the concept of urban land reform and not on relocation and demolition.

¹¹ Oplan Likas = Lumikas para Iwas sa Kalamidad at Sakit or the operation to avoid disaster and sickness from the threats of climate change

Table 14. Manila City Relocation Activities (as of 2016)

Site	No. of ISFs		Relocation Sites	Remarks
	Censused	Relocated		
Estero de Concordia	43	43	Bulacan	100% of ISFs Relocated
Estero de Paco	1,372	1,372	Laguna Bulacan	100% of ISFs Relocated
Estero de Pandacan	1,421	737	Laguna Bulacan c/o NHA	Relocation under the bridge not yet completed
Estero de Valencia	392	302	Bulacan	90 ISFs did not avail of relocation site/assistance
Estero de Sampaloc	78	52	Bulacan	
Estero de San Miguel	1,646	279	c/o Peoples' Plan (on-site/in-city) c/o NHA	
Estero de Quiapo	462	158	Bulacan Cavite c/o Peoples' Plan (on-site/in-city) c/o NHA	
Estero de Sta. Clara	229	153	Cavite	
Estero Dela Reina	1,524	535	Bulacan c/o NHA	Priority project of City of Manila
Estero de Sunog Apog	284	93	Smokey Mountain (for in-city) Cavite	
Estero de Maypajo	498	-	Smokey Mountain (for in-city) Cavite	
San Juan River	427	-	Cavite	
Estero de San Sebastian	132	-	c/o Peoples' Plan (on-site/in-city) c/o NHA	
Tripa de Gallina	624	-	c/o NHA	
Estero de Magdalena	2,382	-		Priority project of City of Manila
Estero de Kabulusan	111	-	c/o NHA	

Estero de San Lazaro	1,567	-		Priority project of City of Manila
Estero de Vitas	218	-		
North and South Antipolo	-	-		Priority project of DPWH
Estero de Tutuban	87	-		Not included in priority areas of PRRC & DPWH
Estero de San Antonio	51	-		
Total	13,548	3,724		

Source: Manila City Relocation & Resettlement Action Plan (2013-2016)

Table 15. Summary of CoCs Approved: Manila City

Year	Location	No. of Families/Structures Affected	Proponent
2014	Radial Road 10 (R10), Tondo, Manila	567 ISFs	DPWH
2014	3-meter legal easement along Estero dela Reina, Brgys. 8 & 9, Zone 1, Tondo, Manila	142 ISFs	MMDA
2015	PPA property in North Harbor, Bgys. 20, 29 & 39, Tondo, Manila	401 ISFs	Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
2015	PPA property in North Harbor, Tondo, Manila under the territorial jurisdiction of Bgys. 29 & 39	91 ISFs	PPA
2015	Barcelona St., Brgy. 283, Sonce 26, Binondo, Manila	40 ISFs	City Engineering
2016*	Concreting/Widening of RROW from Chesa to Pacheck Sts., Radial Road 10, Tondo, Manila	189 ISFs	DPWH
2017	Sidewalk of Radial Road 12, Bgy. 628, Zone 63, Sta. Mesa, Manila	140 ISFs	City Engineering

Source: Minutes of MCHB Meetings

*LIAC Resolution

6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Participatory governance through the Local Housing Board is still evolving. Many cities that institutionalized their LHBs have not maximized the potential of the LHB as a mechanism for greater participation of the community in housing services delivery. Of the three case studies examined, only the Quezon City LHB has been able to build trust between the local government and the peoples organizations (POs). This was done through the inclusion of PO representatives in the LHB decision-making process; their majority representation in the Board; the involvement of the community in the selection of their representatives; and the transparency

with regard to the decisions and discussions of the LHB. Moreover, the provision of a regular funding for socialized housing programs and the POs involvement in developing the City's local shelter plan have created confidence in the community on the intentions of the Quezon City government with regard to housing for the marginalized sectors. The case of the Quezon City LHB shows that greater participation of the community in shelter planning and programs can result in more acceptable socialized housing arrangements for the community. It could be a slow process but violent confrontations can be avoided and the outcomes can be sustainable in the long run when communities accept or agrees with the housing solutions provided.

On the other hand, other cities considered the LHB mainly as a legal tool to carry out eviction and demolition in cases of involuntary relocation. In this case, the LHB is convened only when the need arises; a last resort when incentives or proposals of government fail to work. The essence of participatory governance is not present. Instead, the focus is on "market clearing", which is to achieve the objectives of removing the ISFs in the area. For the "market clearing approach to work, it requires strong authority and substantial funding support from the local government as shown in the case of Pasig City. The approach may also apply when public deliberation fails due to the absence of social capital within the community itself. However, the sustainability of the "market clearing" approach has to be considered as continued funding support to relocated communities can drain the resources of the local government. Not all local governments have similar financial capacities to be able to replicate the Pasig City model. It is also uncertain whether the housing services and other interventions provided have adequately addressed the major concerns of the community so that the relocated families won't have to go back to informal settlements in the city.

The LHB based on its current legal mandate mainly act as a forum for the discussion between affected communities and different government sectors. Except for few LGUs, the actual decision-making power remains within respective Sanggunians and Mayors offices. For the LHB to be an effective platform for participatory governance, the involvement of Peoples Organization in the decision making process should be strengthened through greater representation of the POs and inclusion of the legitimate concerns and suggestions of the affected community in Board decisions. The role of the LHB should be expanded to that of a "mobilizer" of "Peoples Plan", enabling the implementation of community housing projects. The LHB should also be given funding and supported by a socialized housing fund. It should be the sole mechanism for consultation and decision-making for the delivery of housing services; not an alternative to the LIACs. While participatory governance may not apply for certain decisions (e.g. technical matters), in the case of housing services, community driven decision is key to effective and sustainable housing solutions.

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8. Appendices

Appendix A. Quezon City Approved CoCs

Year	Location	No. of Families/Structures Affected
8th: Sept. 28, 2012	P. Florentino cor. Sto. Domingo Sts., Bgy. Sto. Domingo	62 ISFs
	Regalado Avenue cor. Quirino Highway, Bgy. North Fairview	
9th: Oct. 29, 2012	Payatas Elementary School, Brgy. Payatas	46 ISFs
	Luzon Ave. (C-5 Project), Bgy. Tandang Sora	25 ISFs
	Magno Subd., Brgy. Sta. Monica	16 ISFs
	Lots 41-43, Block 86, Franc St., Phase 8, North Fairview	2 retired PNP employees (Professional squatters)
	Lots 17-21, Block 66, Riyal and Yen Sts., North Fairview	Manufacturers of bullets (Professional squatter)
	Victory HOA, Bgy. Bagong Silangan	
10th: Feb. 19, 2013	SAMAKA HOA Inc. Purok 4, Luzon Ave., Bgy. Culiati	
	A-One HOA, Inc., Peacock St., Bgy. Bagong Silangan	
	Lots 29, 30 and 32, Block 66 (LRC) Pcs-18345 Yen/Riyal Sts., Bgy. North Fairview	
	Union Village Extn. Bgy. Culiati; and, Freddie Aquino (Lot Owner)	
12th: Jul. 16, 2013	Agham Rd, North Traingle, Bgy. Bagon Pag-asa	
	Dupax Phase II, Bgy. Old Balara	
	4-Storey School Building, Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma High School Upper Molave, Bgy. Payatas	
	ISFs along the creek and/or portion of a public domain, West Kamias	
13th: Dec. 4, 2013	Payatas C Elementary School, Bgy. Payatas	
	Bistekville 2 (Road Lot), Bgy. Kaligayahan	
	Don Francisco St., Bgy. Old Balara	

	RROW at Pulang Lupa, Pearl St., Bgy. Greater Fairview	
	Mariveles St., Bgy. San Martin de Porres, Cubao	
	Lot 4-13, Block 14, Empire View Park Subd., Payatas B, Bgy. Payatas	
14th: Feb. 4, 2014	Kristong Hari Parish, Bgy. Commonwealth	9 ISFs
15th: Apr. 8, 2014	Structures at 66-D Banahaw St, San Martin de Porres	
	Quirino Highway, Bgy. Bagbag	
	Sitio Balud, Bgy. Culiati	
	Dumpsite, Bgy. Payatas	
	Bistekville 3, Bgy. Escopa II	
	Pairville, Bgy. North Fairview	
16th: Aug. 18, 2014	Service Leasing Mother Ignacia St., Bgy. South Triangle	
	Proposed Construction of Additional School Building (Batasan Hills National High School), IBP Rd., Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Proposed Construction of Additional School Building (Corazon Aquino Elem. School) IBP Rd., Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Proposed Construction of Additional School Building (San Diego Elem. School), IBP Rd., Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Proposed Batasan Hills Trauma Hospital, Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	BIR Rd. [in front of Botanical Garden, Phase 3], Bgy. Central	
	IBP Road Widening Project Phases 1 & 2 (Filinvest to Sinagtala), Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	IBP Road Widening Project Phase 3 (from CSC to San Mateo), Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	IBP Road Widening Project Phase 4 (from DSWD to Litex), Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Villa Beatriz – Zuzuarregui – Commonwealth Ave., Bgy. Old Balara	
	Lots 5 & 6 Blk. 80 Kalayaan Ave., Bgy. Malaya	
	Presidential cor. Legislative Rds., Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Malipaka St., Maligaya Park Subd., Bgy. Pasong Putik Proper	
17th: Dec. 22, 2014	MWSS Employees Housing Project, Bgy. Greater Lagro	
	RROW Pulang-Lupa, Pearl St. Bgy. Greater Fairview	
	Agham Rd./BIR Rd., Bgy. Central, (Phase III)	
	C-5 Extension, Tandang Sora, Bgy. Olf Balara	
	Maningning cor. Matahimik St., Bgy. Malaya	
	Ilang-Ilang St., FERIA Compound, Bgy. Old Balara	
	Site for School (Payatas B Elementary School), Bgy. Payatas	
	Site for School (Payatas C Elementary School), Bgy. Payatas	
	Bistekville 5 Housing Project, Bgy. Payatas	
18th: Jun. 29, 2015	Golden Shower HOAI at #67 Golden Shower St., Grp. 1, Payatas B, Bgy. Payatas	

	Mata Compound HOAI at FFF Extension, Sitio Mabilog, Bgy. Culiat	7
	Holy Spirit Betterville HOAI at Capaz, O'Donnel Sts., Bgy. Holy Spirit	6
	Warayan HOAI at Bougainvilla St., Maligaya Park Subd., Bgy. Pasong Putik	31
	Lot 25 & 26 Blk. 5, Along Commonwealth Ave., Bgy. North Fairview	9
	Lot 8, Blk. 67, Riyal St., North Fairview Subd., Bgy. North Fairview	1
	Lot 9, Blk. 4, Bonifacio St., Sunnyville Subd., Bgy. Pasong Tamo	3
	Villa Maloles Subd., Bgy. Holy Spirit	4
	No. 14 Apollo St., Bgy. Tandang Sora	75
	Sunrise Solid HOAI in bet. Fort Magsaysay and Fort Del Pilar, Bgy. Holy Spirit	9
	39 North Diversion Rd., Pilaes Comp., Balintawak, Bgy. Unang Sigaw	42
	Kalayaan Ave., cor., V. Luna, Bgy. Malaya	36
	No. 82 Kalayaan Ave. Bgys. Central & Teachers Village	33
	Durawood, Bgy. San Bartolome	184
	No. 74 Judge Juan Luna St., Bgy. Bungad	87
19th: Nov. 13, 2015	Proposed Batasan General (Trauma) Hospital at IBP Rd., Bgy. Batasan Hills	
	Sagrada HOAI	
	Kasiyahan HOAI	
	Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Immaculate Concepcion Area C cor. Zuzuarregui HOAI	
	Austria Compound HOAI	
	Orient Meadow HOAI	
	269 Roosevelt Ave. San Francisco Del Monte, Barangay San Antonio	
	8 Agno Extension, Bgy. Tatalon	
20th: Dec. 7, 2015	Lot 31 Blk. 212 Schilling St., Phase 8 North Fairview Subd. Bgy. North Fairview	5 structures
	Narra cor. Sampaguita Sts. Mapayapa Village III, Bgy. Pasong Tamo	
	St. Joseph the Worker Chapel, Dupax St., Bgy. Old Balara	
	320 Quirino Highway, Bgy. Baesa	6 structures
	Illegal structures along the sidewalk of Matapang St., Bgy. Pinyahan	
	Samar St., Group 6, Area B, Bgy. Payatas (PATAS HOAI CMP Project)	
	Sitio nMendez, Bgy. Baesa (CMP Project)	
	Samahang Mamamayan Maralita ng Luzon Ave., Area I, Bgy. Old Balara (CMP Project)	

21st: Mar. 21, 2016	6 J.P. Rizal St., Bgy. Marilag	3 ISFs
	Along Central Ave., Sitio Mabilog, Bgy. Culiati	30 structures
	No. 421 Kabute Compound, San Jose St., San Bartolome	30 structures
	Illegal Structures along Sidewalk of Matapang St., Bgy. Pinyahan	2 structures
	Dahlia Ave., Bgy. Greater Fairview (Proposed 4-Storey Bldg.)	63 ISFs, 35 Structures
	Auburn, Aspen Sts., Bgy. North Fairview (Proposed Additional School Bldg., North Fairview)	28 ISFs
	Bistekville IV, Metro Heights, Bgy. Culiati	11 structures
	Bistekville 16, Pasacola St., Bgy. Nagkaisang Nayon	
	Lots 29, 31, Blk. 211, Mark St., Phase 8, North Fairview Subd., North Fairview	7 structures
	Along Commonwealth Ave. Near Tandang Sora Ave., Bgy. Old Balara (Kintanar Enterprise Property)	6
22nd: May 23, 2016	Tullahan River, Sitio Gitna Riverside, Bgy. Nagkaisang Nayon (On-going DPWH Flood Mitigation Project)	25
	Dona Tomasa Riverside, Bgy. San Bartolome (DPWH Flood Mitigation Project)	
	Blk. 10, Lot 5, St. Michael St., Republic Ave., Bgy. Holy Spirit	
23rd: Jul. 20, 2016	M. Castro St., Victoria Subd., Bgy. Tandang Sora	
	Mindanao Ave. Extension, Bgy. Greater Lagro	2 ISFs, 1 structure
	Lot 10, Blk. 179 Mindanao Ave., Extension, Bgy. Sta. Monica	4 structures
	North Triangle Relocation and Resttlement Project by NHA	
	Bgys. Bahay Toro & Sto. Cristo (Project of PRRC)	
24th: Feb. 20, 2017	Bistekville Housing Project, Buenamar Subd., Novaliches Proper	50 ISFs, 33 structures
25th: May 29, 2017	Justice Cecilia Munoz Plam High School, upper Molave, Bgy. Payatas	1 ISF
	Bistekville 3, Bgy. Escopa 2 (Libis Area)	2 structures
	Manotoc Subd., Bgy. Baesa	30 ISFs
	Maxima Dr., Bgy. Balon Bato	
	Holy Spirit Drive cor. Paraluman St., Bgy. Holy Spirit	
	Proposed Bgy. Hall, Bgy. Batasan Hills, Dakila St. cor. San Mateo Road	4 structures
	Malakas Lane RROW, District IV, Bgy. Central	
	PRRC Culiati Creek Package 2 (Bgys. Bagong Pag-asa, Culiati and Varsa)	118 ISFs
	PRRC Culiati Creek Package 2 (Bgy. Old Capitol Site)	144 ISFs
	PRRC Pasong Tamo Creek Package 2 (Bgy. Bahay Toro-Sinagtala)	81 ISFs
	PRRC Pasong Tamo Creek Package 3 (Bgys. Katipunan, Ramon Magsaysay, S&R area, Alicia, Bahay Toro, Sitio Gaya-gaya, Bathala and Under the Bridge Congressional Ave.	99 ISFs
	PRRC San Francisco River Package 1 (Bgys. Talayan, Mariblo and Damayan)	459 ISFs

	PRRC San Francisco River Package 2 (Bgys. Masambon and Del Monte)	181 ISFs
	PRRC San Francisco River Package 3 (Bgys. Apolonio Samson and San Antonio)	57 ISFs
	Easement along San Francisco River, Bgy. Damayan	3 structures
	Lot 12 Blk. 179 Mindanao Ave. Ext., Bgy. North Fairview	
	Anahaw St., District VI, Bgy. Culiati	
	NHV New Haven Village, Bgy. Kaligayahan, Novaliches	3 structures
	Bgy. Road, Bgy. Pasong Tamo	8 ISFs
26th: Aug. 15, 2017	14 Maunawin cor. Mabilis Sts. Bgy. Pinyahan	9 ISFs, 9 structures
	Creek Easement at No. 8 East Riverside, Bgy. Paraiso	1 ISF, 1 structure
	Esmeralda St., on top of a Creek San Beda Village, Bgy. Bahay Toro	1 ISF, 1 structure
	Under NLEX-Camachile Bridge at Bgy. Blonbato, Bgy. Unang Sigaw	498 ISFs
	Lot 1, Blk. 14 and Lot 2 Blk. 15 No. 16 Armando St. Bgy. Bagbag	16 ISFs, 2 structures
	Lot 6, Blk. 177, Commonwealth Ave., Bgy. North Fairview	1 ISF, 1 structure
	Lot 40, Blk. 211, Labayane St., Bgy. North Fairview	1 structure
	Lot No. 11, Block 4, Brilliant Ville, Bgy. Bagong Silangan	86 ISFs
	Along Commonwealth Ave. (Laura St. Zuzaregui) Bgy. Old Balara	
	Bgy. Libis (Waterways - Creekside)	3 ISFs
27th: Nov. 29, 2017	138-139 Ermin Garcia St. (Cambridge), Bgy. E. Rodriguez	
	Bistekville 20, Bgy. Old Balara	
	Calvary, Bgy. Damayang Lagi	
	Kaingin Bukid, Bgy. Apolonio Samson	
	Transmission Line Upgrading Project in Bgy. Sangandaan	
	Madjaas Homes Homeowners Association, Inc. (CMP)	15 structures
	Don Alfonso St. cor. Dupax St., Bgy. Old Balara	
	Lots 1 & 2, Blk. 177 Labayane St. cor. Commonwealth Ave., Bgy. North Fairview	

Source: Authors' representation of information from the minutes of QCHB Meetings

Note: Some of the minutes of the QCHB Meetings have incomplete information on the details of the CoCs

Appendix B. 2018 Tagging & Census Validation for COC

A. Bgy. Maybunga, Pasig City

A. Information on Households	
1.0 Listed and Interviewed	No. of ISFs
1.1 Owner	664
1.2 Co-Owner	85
1.3 Renter	360
1.4 Sharer/Rent-Free Occupant	304

1.5 Caretaker	1
Sub-total	1,414
2.0 Listed but not interviewed	
2.1 Out During Census	
Owner	62
Co-owner	10
Sharer/Rent-Free Occupant	68
Renter	77
Sub-total	217
2.2 Absentee (<i>No Interview Required</i>)	
Absentee House Owner	267
Absentee House Co-Owner	31
Sub-total	298
2.3 Refused Interview (<i>No Interview Required</i>)	
Renter	1
Sub-total	1
3.0 Awardee	
NHA Awardee	
Owner	27
Co-Owner	9
Sharer	1
PCUP Awardee	
Owner	2
Co-owner	1
GK Recipient	
Owner	1
Sub-total	41
4.0 Below 6 months residing (not interviewed)	
Renter	6
Sharer	1
Sub-total	7
Total	1,978 ISFs

B. Bgy. Rosario, Pasig City

B. Information on Households	
1.0 Listed and Interviewed	No. of ISFs
1.1 Owner	227

1.2 Co-Owner	49
1.3 Renter	167
1.4 Sharer/Rent-Free Occupant	140
1.5 Caretaker	1
Sub-total	584
2.0 Listed but not interviewed	
2.1 Out During Census	
Owner	19
Co-owner	3
Renter	45
Sharer/Rent-Free Occupant	20
Caretaker	0
Sub-total	87
2.2 Absentee (<i>No Interview Required</i>)	
Absentee House Owner	91
Absentee House Co-Owner	24
Sub-total	115
3.0 Awardee	
NHA Awardee	
Owner	8
Co-Owner	2
Renter	5
LRB Awardee	
Owner	3
Sub-total	18
4.0 Below 6 months residing (not interviewed)	
Renter	9
Sharer	1
Sub-total	10
Total	814 ISFs

Source: Data from PHRU

*Both voluntary and involuntary ISFs are included in the household count indicated in the COCs

Appendix C. Financial Assistance for ISFs residing along West Berm, Manggahan Floodway, Pasig City

Financial Assistance of (Php 20,000)		
Calauan Resettlement Site		38
TANAY (Eastshine, Tanay, Rizal)		562
Low Rise Building (LRB/NHA)		228
Medium Rise Building (MRB/LGU)		183
Total		1,011
1,011 ISFs x 20,000.00 = Php 20,220,000.00		
Financial Assistance (Balik Probinsya)		72 ISFs
72 ISFs x 30,720.00 = Php 2,211,840.00		
Summary:		
1,011 x 20,000.00		
=	20,220,000.00	
72 x 30,720.00 =	2,211,840.00	
TOTAL	22,431,840.00	

Source: Data from PHRU

***Some involuntary ISFs who underwent deliberation are still included in the budget for the assistance. Involuntary ISFs who did not undergo deliberation are excluded from the budget*