Enhancing Disaster Risk Governance and Resilience: Lessons from Supertyphoon Yolanda

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SC

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Act Now or Pay Later Webinar SERP-P Project, Philippine Institute for Development Studies 20 July 2023

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
Outline

- Project Background, Objectives and Framework
- Setting: The Philippines and Leyte
- General Frameworks for the Philippines as well as foreign and international aid in DRRM in the Philippines
- Relationship of international actors with national and local governments in affected communities after Haiyan
- Impact of interventions on human security and resilience
- Assessment of interventions and Lessons for Disaster Risk Governance and Resilience



1. Project Background

- **Title:** Poverty Alleviation in the Wake of Typhoon Yolanda
- **Project Partners:** University of Nottingham, UK; University of Nottingham, Ningbo Campus, China; University of the Philippines, Diliman
- **Funders:** The United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Dept. of Foreign and International Development (DFID)
- Implementing Unit in UPD: Dept. of Political Science
- Other Partners (Operational): UP Visayas Tacloban Campus and UP Manila
- Duration: March 2015 2018



Project Background

- Overarching aim:
 - To identify strategies that work in relation to poverty alleviation in post-disaster environments
 - To ascertain the conditions necessary for the success and scaling up of these strategies based on the case of relief efforts in selected Yolanda areas
- Focus: urban population risk, vulnerability to disasters and resilience towards environmental shocks
- Framework: Resilience and human security
- **Practical Objective**: Assessing barangays across three Leyte LGUs affected by Yolanda (Tacloban City, Palo and Tanauan)





Research Methods

- Documentary review
- Key informant interviews (representatives of national government agencies, international agencies, civil society groups, local governments)
- Household surveys (household head/spouse in 20 barangays)
- Focus group discussions (women, PWDs, elderly, youth, mixed group)
- Family Interviews (2 families per barangay)



Framework: Human Security and Resilience

- Human Security as freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity
 - Addresses the protection of people (individuals and communities) from critical and pervasive threats to their lives, livelihood, and *dignity*, including the downside of development (*HSR* 2003)
 - top-down (protection) and *bottom-up* (empowerment) approaches
- Resilience "the capacity of any entity an individual, a community, an organisation, of a natural system to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience" (Rodin 2015, 3)
 - linked intimately with vulnerability and capacity
 - *marginalization* = human security approach



Framework: Human security and resilience


- The *human security approach* targets the vulnerable and directly addresses factors that increase vulnerability to poverty, disease, conflict, and disempowerment (Mani 2005); also requires mechanisms to be established at different levels of government and to focus on *governance* to protect communities from threats
- Communities, particularly the marginalized, are "the most effective locus of disaster preparedness activities" (Alcayna 2016) and hence must define their own resilience.
- Post-Disaster resilience: shelter and livelihood



2. Setting: The Philippines

- Geographically prone to natural hazards: Pacific Rim of Fire (earthquakes, volcanoes, typhoons)
- Ranked fourth by the Global Climate Risk Index among countries most affected by extreme weather events from 2000 to 2019 (Eckstein, Kunzel and Schafer 2021)
- fifth most vulnerable country in terms of disaster risk implications for development capacity (UNISDR 2015)
- Inequitable growth and high poverty
 - Longest running insurgency in Asia

2. Setting: Leyte Province



- Located in Eastern
 Visayas (poorest region in 2012)
- Characterized by huge economic inequalities
- Struggling local economy still dependent on natural resources (agriculture)
- Patronage politics and local elites





2. Setting: Haiyan / Yolanda's Effect in 2013

- Total damage: US\$ 1,890,130,000 (NDRRMC 2014)
- 6,193 dead, 1,061 missing and 28,689 injured (Official Gazette of the Philippines)
- People affected (livelihood and environmental and food security): 16 million, with nearly 4.4 million displaced (NEDA 2013)

3. National Frameworks Guiding the Philippines Re: Disasters

- International frameworks: Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) transformed the way we see disasters.
- The Philippines has a strong set of policies, frameworks and plans for DRRM. The DRRM law (PDRRM Law of 2010) created the NDRRMC and established local councils at various local government levels to replicate the NDRRMC's responsibilities. It also recognizes the role of civil society organizations in DRRM.
- The Office of Civil Defense, under the Dept. of National Defense, is the implementing arm of the NDRRMC.
- Climate Change Act of 2009 also places disaster risk reduction as first line of defense against climate change risks.
- However, local councils are often understaffed, underbudgeted, or lacking professionalization and awareness and a significant gap exists as the NDRRMC cannot supervise all the local councils. (no local DRRM plans; no adequate budget)




3. General guidelines for foreign and international agencies' DRRM assistance

- There are points for partnership and coordination with foreign and international agencies.
- National government cluster system and UN cluster system under UN OCHA pre-exists Haiyan (since 2007)
- Parallel system with the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Multinational Coordination Council



The UN Cluster System



The Philippine Cluster System

CLUSTER	Government Lead
Nutrition	Department of Health (DOH)
Water, sanitation & hygiene	
(WASH)	
Health	
Emergency Shelter	Department of Social
Protection	Welfare and Development
Food	(DSWD)
Livelihood	
Camp Coordination and	Office of Civil Defense –
Management	Provincial Disaster
	Coordinating Council
	(OCD-PDCC)
Logistics	Office of Civil Defense
Emergency	(OCD)
Telecommunication	
Early recovery	
Education	Department of Education
	(DepEd)
Agriculture	Department of Agriculture
	(DA)



5. Limits Despite Having a National Institutional Framework

- Some departments bypassed the NDRRMC coordination and the Office of Civil Defense and worked independently. The creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery may have added another level and further confusion.
- Despite substantial devolution and coordination frameworks in place, many LGUs have limited technical and financial capacities, and in the process got overwhelmed by the devastation, or uninformed about the protocols or procedures needed, or have other priorities other than DDR.
- Many local constituents were informed about the super typhoon but reluctant to leave for varying reasons and uninformed about what to do.
- Political rivalries between the national and local governments, political alliances and patronage politics got in the way of efficient response.



4. The Role of Foreign and International Agencies Post-Yolanda

- Countries were "far more generous than usual" (Chughtai 2013)
- UN emergency response: L3 (highest)
- US\$ 1.64 billion cash and noncash aid pledges (DBM 2015)
- US\$ 865,151,866 (UN OCHA)



4. Relationship of foreign and international agencies with national and local governments in affected communities after Haiyan

- Based on assessments, the national government played an integral role during the response efforts with the international UN cluster system joining the government cluster system and with most foreign agencies saying that coordination was good for the most part.
- However, different reports also highlight significant tension between the government and INGOs as the latter's response led to the sudden influx of international actors which undermined the usual procedures and relationships established by the Philippine government.
- Some foreign agencies also did not consult government agencies and communities in terms of priority needs of the community.



4. Relationship of foreign and international agencies with national and local governments in affected communities after Haiyan

There are cases of different actors working in <u>parallel and duplicating</u> <u>efforts</u> alongside cases of exemplary programming and collaboration. Parallel efforts occurred because of the ff:

- Some national NGOs were unaware of the cluster system and the system also did not actively engage national NGOs.

- Some LGUs were also unaware of the cluster system or weak because of the disaster.

- Some INGOs, organizations and individuals distrusted the national and local governments and avoided collaboration and coordination.

- Coordination was difficult due to the scale of the disaster.

- NDRRMC also has a number of weaknesses and limitations. The AFP also had difficulties. (Other crises)

<u>Results</u>: Market distortion; many families and individuals received multiple cash and other items but others did not. (e.g. Tzu Chi Foundation)



Exemplary Programs

- UN WASH and Protection Clusters (history of engagement)
- UN OCHA
- Catholic Relief Services
- UNDP's holistic livelihood programs
- World Vision
- Oxfam's new SOP after Yolanda
- Pope Francis Village relocation and livelihood programs
- Municipality of Tanauan first Yolanda-hit LGU to submit a completed rehab plan to the national government

- LGU (municipal hall) designated "sectorial" focal persons to coordinate relief efforts and system allowed coordination and assignments of relief efforts on rebuilding across barangays



5. Impact of interventions on human security and resilience

- Some international agencies were able to provide short-term employment. However, the problem now is sustainable livelihood opportunities for Yolanda areas.
- Some barangays still complain about food scarcity either because they do not have the money to buy food or the place where they are staying, i.e. some resettlement areas are far from places like the sea and farms to source food.
- New infrastructure projects like barangay health centers have been set up in some areas but access to health services and insurance like affordable medicine is still an issue in many areas, especially in resettlement areas. Some sectors like the elderly and PWDs need more assistance in this area.
- Safe housing (relocation and on-site) is still an issue.



5. Impact of interventions on human security and resilience

- Many individuals and communities still suffer from vulnerabilities. A lack of sustainable livelihood, inadequate and unsafe housing, the inadequate provision of utilities such as water and electricity and incomplete infrastructures such as roads and drainage in the resettlement areas continue to threaten the communities' abilities to 'build back better'. The capacity to protect themselves, their families and communities from future disasters and day-to-day safety issues remains tenuous in many cases.
- However, some agencies that remained have been giving a number of barangays trainings in DRRM, budgeting and planning.
- For a short time, foreign and international agencies replaced local and national patrons as communities became heavily dependent on them.



6. Tentative Conclusions

- Both national and local governance mechanisms and programs for DRRM have not been adequate for Yolanda's impact.
- While significant and comprising majority of interventions during the relief phase and in a limited sense in the recovery phase, the assistance from international and national non-state actors have not addressed most of the human security concerns of people as well as resilience in the three areas.
- There were questions about the priorities of these aid agencies, duplication of aid, and whether they took into consideration the inputs and actual needs of the people and communities affected. In some cases, they replicated the patron-client relations.
- It is also the nature of aid that it is only temporary. Some aid agencies' mandate is only in the relief phase and not in the reconstruction and development phase.



6. Lessons

- Stronger national and local disaster frameworks. Even with plenty of aid agencies present, there should be improved coordination with national and local governments being in the lead in terms of identification, distribution and prioritization of appropriate aid. A stronger national and local framework for coordination of risk reduction, response and assistance is necessary. The regional level is also crucial.
- **Capacity-building of National Government.** The role of the national government, particularly key agencies like DSWD, as the coordinating and monitoring agency is crucial. Thus, capacities and mechanisms must be improved to take on these functions.
- Capacity-building of Local Governments and Local Governance frameworks. Capacities and accountability mechanisms of LGUs must also be enhanced. Local CSOs are also important. These should be the focus of assistance.
- **Community empowerment and Localization.** Communities, particularly the most vulnerable ones, have to play an active role in recovery and resiliency plans. They also must be empowered. After all, external aid is not permanent. Social capital, trusts and networks must be the basis of any plan or program.
- Strengthened international coordination and response. International and regional response systems can also be improved and coordinated better with various stakeholders. ASEAN's AADMER and AHA Center must also be strengthened with emphasis on capacity-building and localization.



Thank you! Salamat po!





